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Wrong Turn on the Ex Post Facto Clause 
Paul D. Reingold* and Kimberly Thomas** 
The Ex Post Facto Clause bars any increase in punishment after 
the commission of a crime. But deciding what constitutes an increase 
in punishment can be tricky. At the front end of a criminal case, where 
new or amended criminal laws might lengthen prisoners’ sentences if 
applied retroactively, courts have routinely struck down such changes 
under the Ex Post Facto Clause. At the back end, however, where new 
or amended parole laws or policies might lengthen prisoners’ 
sentences in exactly the same way if applied retroactively, courts have 
used a different standard and upheld the changes under the Ex Post 
Facto Clause. Because the harm is identical and lies at the core of 
what the Ex Post Facto Clause is supposed to protect against, we think 
the asymmetry is mistaken. 
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Parole is an integral part of punishment: it determines how much 
time people will serve on their sentences. Until the twenty-first century, 
black-letter law forbade even modest parole changes that were 
adverse to prisoners. If a change in the parole regime might lead to 
longer sentences, then courts insisted that the change be applied 
prospectively only. Over the last two decades, relying on language in 
two US Supreme Court parole cases decided in 1995 and 2000, the 
lower courts have shifted parole ex post facto doctrine by 180 degrees. 
Prisoners can no longer prevail, even when the change in the state 
parole regime is almost certain to lead to significantly longer 
sentences. 
In the context of parole, the courts have repudiated past doctrine 
and strayed far from the purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause. In this 
article, we review the history, show how the current case law is 
misguided and illogical, and put forward a new framework that would 
restore the Ex Post Facto Clause to its rightful place. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Ex Post Facto Clause says, “No State shall . . . pass any . . . ex post 
facto Law . . . .”1 Although the Latin phrase “ex post facto” literally encompasses 
any law passed “after the fact,” by 1800 the US Supreme Court had recognized, 
in Calder v. Bull, that the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws applies 
only to penal statutes.2 In Calder, Justice Chase described the reach of the Ex 
Post Facto Clause as follows: 
1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, 
and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 
2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, 
when committed. 3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and 
inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when 
committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and 
receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time 
of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender.3 
Justice Chase’s four categories in Calder were originally viewed as exclusive: if 
a change of law did not fit within those four categories, then it was not covered 
by the Ex Post Facto Clause.4 For much of the nineteenth century, the Ex Post 
Facto Clause played a fairly narrow role: it was primarily invoked to prevent 
new punishments from being imposed retroactively for past criminal conduct.5 
In the late 1800s, however, the precise contours of the Ex Post Facto Clause 
became less clear as the US Supreme Court struggled to apply the Calder 
categories consistently. In that epoch the Court expanded the reach of the Ex 
Post Facto Clause to bar not just substantive changes to criminal laws, but also 
some arguably procedural changes that affected significant rights or seriously 
disadvantaged criminal defendants. 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 2. 3 U.S. 386, 390–92 (1798). But see Evan C. Zoldan, The Civil Ex Post Facto Clause, 2015 
WIS. L. REV. 727 (arguing that the historical doctrine is misplaced and that the clause originally 
encompassed civil as well as criminal laws); see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson 
(Aug. 13, 1813) (“[T]he sentiment that ex post facto laws are against natural right is so strong in the 
United States, that few, if any, of the State constitutions have failed to proscribe them. [T]he federal 
constitution indeed interdicts them in criminal cases only; but they are equally unjust in civil as in 
criminal cases and the omission of a caution which would have been right, does not justify the doing 
what is wrong.”). 
 3. Calder, 3 U.S. at 390. 
 4. Justice Chase himself may have taken a broader view, noting that “All these, and similar 
laws, are manifestly unjust and oppressive.” Id. at 391 (emphasis added and removed); see also Zoldan, 
supra note 2, at 743–49 (citing historical material in support of the broader view). 
 5. See, e.g., Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277 (1867) (invalidating a state constitutional 
provision that barred people from holding public office or practicing their professions absent taking an 
oath stating that they had not supported the rebellion); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 138–39 (1810) 
(invalidating a retroactive law that forfeited title and permitted state seizure of estates for past criminal 
acts); Wayne A. Logan, “Democratic Despotism” and Constitutional Constraint: An Empirical 
Analysis of Ex Post Facto Claims in State Courts, 12 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 439 (2004). 
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Two cases exemplify the Court’s more expansive interpretation. First, in 
1883, in Kring v. Missouri,6 the Court held that “any law passed after the 
commission of an offence which . . . ‘in relation to that offence, or its conse-
quences, alters the situation of a party to his disadvantage,’ is an ex post facto 
law.”7 Second, in 1898, in Thompson v. Utah,8 the Court held that retroactive 
procedural statutes can violate the Ex Post Facto Clause unless they “leave 
untouched all the substantial protections with which existing law surrounds the 
person accused of crime.”9 In Thompson, the Court struck down a Utah law that 
retroactively reduced the size of criminal juries from twelve to eight persons, 
because the change deprived the defendant of “a substantial right involved in his 
liberty.”10 
It took almost another hundred years before the Court’s more expansive 
interpretation of the Ex Post Facto Clause was put to rest.11 In the 1990 case 
 
 6. 107 U.S. 221 (1883). Kring involved a plea to second-degree murder that was overturned 
on appeal, resulting in a conviction for first-degree murder (and a death sentence) on remand. The law 
in effect when the defendant committed his crime and pled guilty treated his plea as an acquittal of the 
higher charge. But a new state constitution, applied retroactively, abrogated that law. The state court 
held that the “change is a change not in crimes, but in criminal procedure, and such changes are not ex 
post facto.” Id. at 224. The US Supreme Court reversed, holding (5–4) that the amendment could not be 
applied retroactively. The label “crime” or “criminal procedure” was of no moment: what mattered was 
the change in circumstances to the defendant’s detriment. Id. at 228–229. 
 7. Id. at 235. On the other hand, the very next year the Court held that permitting a felon to 
testify against an accused was not an ex post facto violation even though felons were forbidden from 
testifying in criminal cases when the defendant committed his crime; the change was viewed as merely 
procedural. See Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884). 
 8. 170 U.S. 343 (1898). 
 9. Id. at 352. 
 10. Id. at 351–53 (holding that the change violates the Ex Post Facto Clause because it 
“materially impairs the right of the accused”). Later in the same term, in Thompson v. Missouri, the 
Court distinguished Kring, saying that the right at issue in Kring was “a substantial one—indeed, it 
constituted a complete defence against the charge of murder in the first degree—that could not be taken 
from the accused by subsequent legislation,” and therefore was “not simply a change in procedure.” 171 
U.S. 380, 383–84 (1898) (emphasis omitted). In Thompson v. Missouri, handwriting samples were 
admitted against the accused, resulting in his conviction; on appeal the court held that the admission of 
the samples was error and reversed on that basis. In the meantime, the state amended its laws to allow 
the admission of handwriting samples, which were then used at the trial on remand to convict the 
defendant again. The Court found no ex post facto violation because the evidentiary change did not 
“affect the substantial rights of one put on trial for crime” nor did it “require ‘less proof, in amount or 
degree,’ than was required at the time of the commission of the crime.” Id. at 387. 
 11. Other cases skirted the issue without resolving it. For example, in Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 
167 (1925), at the time of the crime (embezzlement), joint defendants were entitled by state law to 
separate trials. By the time of the trial, joint defendants were no longer entitled to separate trials (except 
in capital cases). Id. at 169. The Court found no ex post facto violation, stating that “it is now well settled 
that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused of 
a defense and which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not 
prohibited.” Id. at 170. The Beazel Court cited with approval Kring and Thompson v. Utah, as well as 
Hopt and Thompson v. Missouri, even though those two sets of cases are not easy to reconcile. Id. at 
171. Likewise, in Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977), the Court held that a retroactive change in 
state law did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. In Dobbert, at the time of the crime (capital murder), 
state law forbade the imposition of the death penalty if a majority of the jury recommended mercy. By 
the time of trial, the law had been amended to make the jury’s decision a recommendation that was not 
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Collins v. Youngblood,12 the Court reversed Kring and Thompson, holding that 
those decisions went beyond Justice Chase’s definitions in Calder. The Court 
rejected the Kring and Thompson rationale (that the defendant need only be 
“substantially disadvantaged”) because “the prohibition which may not be 
evaded is the one defined by the Calder categories,”13 and Calder says nothing 
about “disadvantaging” defendants. Accordingly, retroactive changes do not run 
afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause unless they make innocent conduct criminal 
(Calder category 1), aggravate the crime (category 2), increase the punishment 
(category 3), or change the type or quantum of proof required for a conviction 
(category 4).14 Post-Collins, a significant “disadvantage” to the defendant is not 
enough unless the change also fits within one of the four Calder categories.15 
 
binding on the court. The trial court rejected the jury’s 10–2 recommendation for mercy and imposed 
the death penalty. The Court said it is: 
well settled . . . that “[t]he inhibition upon the passage of ex post facto laws does not give a 
criminal a right to be tried, in all respects, by the law in force when the crime charged was 
committed.” Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 590 (1896). “[T]he constitutional provision 
was intended to secure substantial personal rights against arbitrary and oppressive legislation, 
see Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180, 183 [(1915)], and not to limit the legislative 
control of remedies and modes of procedure which do not affect matters of substance.” 
Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 293. 
Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 293. The Court described the change as “procedural” with no change in “the quan-
tity or the degree of proof necessary to establish [the defendant’s] guilt.” Id. at 294 (quoting Hopt v. 
Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 589–90 (1884)). 
 12. 497 U.S. 37 (1990). 
 13. Id. at 46; see also Beazell, 269 U.S. at 169–70 (explaining the Calder categories). 
 14. Collins, 497 U.S. at 46. In Collins, the Court upheld the reformation of an improper 
conviction pursuant to a law that was passed after the defendant committed his crime but was applied 
retroactively to him. Absent the new statute, the error would have entitled the defendant to a new trial. 
The Supreme Court said that the statute did not: 
punish as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done; nor make 
more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission; nor deprive one charged 
with crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed. 
Its application to respondent therefore is not prohibited by the Ex Post Facto Clause . . . . 
Id. at 52. For a modern case addressing the sufficiency of the evidence prong of the Ex Post Facto Clause, 
see Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513 (2000) (holding that a statutory amendment changing the 
corroborating evidence requirement for convictions of sexual offenses violates the Ex Post Facto Clause 
when applied retroactively); see also Danielle Kitson, It’s an Ex Post Fact: Supreme Court Misapplies 
the Ex Post Facto Clause to Criminal Procedure Statutes, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (2001) 
(discussing Carmell). 
 15. The debate about what can be shoehorned into the Calder categories has continued into the 
twenty-first century. In Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003), the defendant was convicted of 
crimes committed several decades earlier, subject to a then-existing 3-year statute of limitations. But a 
retroactive amendment permitted such charges to be brought within a year of their being reported to 
state authorities. The California courts found no ex post facto violation. The US Supreme Court reversed 
(5–4), with acrimonious opinions on both sides. Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, invoked Justice 
Chase for the proposition that “the Clause protects liberty by preventing governments from enacting 
statutes with ‘manifestly unjust and oppressive’ retroactive effects.” Stogner, 539 U.S. at 611 (citing 
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 391 (1798)). Breyer concluded that: 
The second [Calder] category—including any “law that aggravates a crime, or makes it 
greater than it was, when committed,”—describes California’s statute as long as those words 
are understood as Justice Chase understood them—i.e., as referring to a statute that “inflict[s] 
punishments, where the party was not, by law, liable to any punishment.” 
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With this history as a backdrop, we examine the Ex Post Facto Clause 
through the lens of parole. In Part I, we trace the robust ex post facto protections 
against increases in punishment via delayed or deferred parole, which were 
firmly established by the Supreme Court and entrenched in the lower courts by 
the end of the twentieth century. In Part II, we describe the Court’s subtle but 
important shift to a less protective ex post facto regime in two parole cases just 
before and at the turn of the millennium. In Part III, we show how lower federal 
courts have taken the Court’s modest shift and turned the Ex Post Facto Clause 
on its head vis-à-vis parole, all but eliminating parole from the clause’s coverage. 
In Part IV, we diagnose the causes of this constitutional “wrong turn” and 
disentangle the doctrinal morass that ex post facto law has become in the context 
of parole. We propose a way forward that makes sense of and harmonizes the 
US Supreme Court’s doctrine, the constitutional history, and the underlying 
purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Specifically, we distinguish two categories 
of ex post facto claims that have been raised but not treated separately in the 
cases—namely, obvious or per se violations versus those that require some 
factual development—and we set out a framework for analyzing these distinct 
categories of ex post facto claims. In addition to keying off the history and 
purpose of the clause, we keep an eye on the practical needs of the people 
affected by the Court’s doctrine (prisoners), who have few resources to litigate 
these cases and no political influence to promote doctrinal change on their own. 
I. 
THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE AND PAROLE: EARLY PROTECTION AGAINST 
CHANGES THAT MIGHT INCREASE PUNISHMENT 
Modern penal codes enacted starting in the early-to-mid-twentieth century 
raised new ex post facto questions. In many states and in the federal system, 
indeterminate sentencing replaced flat sentencing. Prisons started offering 
school, job, and mental health programs that created incentives for prisoners to 
work toward their own rehabilitation, with the hope of early release. Parole 
boards proliferated, with the goal of making informed, professional, and 
consistent decisions about early release. As these new penal models were 
introduced and flourished, the US Supreme Court had to decide if the Ex Post 
 
Id. at 613 (internal citations omitted). Justice Kennedy, writing for the dissent, strongly disagreed. He 
said that the words of the second Calder category: 
do not permit the Court’s holding, but indeed foreclose it. A law which does not alter the 
definition of the crime but only revives prosecution does not make the crime “greater than it 
was, when committed.” Until today, a plea in bar has not been thought to form any part of 
the definition of the offense. 
Id. at 633 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). For academic discussion of Stogner, see, for example, Joan 
Comparet-Cassani, Extending the Statute of Limitations in Child Molestation Cases Does Not Violate 
the Ex Post Facto Clause of Stogner, 5 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 303 (2006); Ashran Jen, 
Stogner v. California: A Collision Between the Ex Post Facto Clause and California’s Interest in 
Protecting Child Sex Abuse Victims, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 723 (2004). 
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Facto Clause applied to the many and various new features of these models—
features like indeterminate sentencing, “good time” and other sentence credits, 
as well as parole itself.16 Any or all of these features could affect how much time 
a person would serve on a given sentence. Parole was the paradigmatic example, 
because if statutory, regulatory, or policy changes made parole harder to get 
(than it had been when people committed their crimes), and if the changes 
applied retroactively, then by definition some people might serve more time in 
prison than they would have served but for the retroactive changes. 
Before the Court examined these new penal models, its landmark ex post 
facto case on changes in sentencing had been Lindsey v. Washington, decided in 
1937.17 In Lindsey, the Court found an ex post facto violation where an amended 
statute changed a criminal penalty from “not more than fifteen years,”18 with a 
judge-set minimum of six months to five years, to a flat fifteen years, but giving 
the parole board authority to determine the actual length of imprisonment after 
the prisoner had served six months. Even though prisoners could have served up 
to fifteen years under the old statute, the Court held that the retroactive 
application of the new statute violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because the 
“standard of punishment adopted by the new statute is more onerous than that of 
the old.”19 Whether the prisoners would have received or served shorter 
sentences under the former statute was immaterial, given that the amendment 
created the potential for at least some prisoners to serve longer sentences under 
the new regime. 
Lindsey quoted text from Kring and Thompson—namely that “[i]t is plainly 
to the substantial disadvantage of petitioners to be deprived of all opportunity to 
receive a sentence which would give them freedom from custody and control 
prior to the expiration of the 15-year term.”20 This language was later disavowed 
in Collins, yet the Collins Court did not reverse Lindsey (as it had Kring and 
Thompson) because it conceded that some Lindsey prisoners might wind up 
serving longer sentences than they could have served when they committed their 
crimes, and thus their ex post facto claim satisfied the third Calder category of 
“increase in the punishment.”21 
In 1980—again, before the Court had narrowed the reach of the Ex Post 
Facto Clause in Collins22—the Court finally had to address a feature of a back-
 
 16. For an interesting discussion of lex mitior, a doctrine which bars imposing the greater, 
original punishment if the punishment is later decreased—the inverse of ex post facto protection—see 
Peter Westen, Lex Mitior: Converse of Ex Post Facto and Window into Criminal Desert, 18 NEW CRIM. 
L. REV. 167 (2015) (discussing lex mitior and the implications for purposes of punishment and “desert”). 
 17. 301 U.S. 397 (1937). 
 18. Id. at 398 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 9.54.090 (1955)). 
 19. Id. at 400–01. 
 20. Id. at 401–02. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 45 (1990) (holding that changes that 
“disadvantage” the defendant but were otherwise unrelated to the crime or the punishment or the type 
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end modern penal code, as opposed to a direct front-end sentencing issue, as in 
Lindsey. In Weaver v. Graham,23 the Court barred the state from retroactively 
reducing the “gain time” that prisoners could earn to hasten their parole-
eligibility date. The Court made clear that retroactive changes that could 
lengthen the time served on a sentence fell within the rubric of “punishment” and 
thus also fell within the ambit of the Ex Post Facto Clause. 
The Weaver Court recognized that retroactive changes to such early release 
provisions are no different from retroactive changes to initial sentencing 
provisions (like those that were at issue in Lindsey): they implicate the Ex Post 
Facto Clause because they are “one determinant” of how long a person will 
serve, and because the person’s “effective sentence is altered once this 
determinant is changed.”24 Suspending or withdrawing such provisions 
constitutes an increase in punishment because a “prisoner’s eligibility for 
reduced imprisonment is a significant factor entering into both the defendant’s 
decision to plea bargain and the judge’s calculation of the sentence to be 
imposed.”25 The Court also noted that relief under the Ex Post Facto Clause is 
based not on the individual’s right to less punishment, but rather on the values 
the Ex Post Facto Clause was designed to protect—namely to ensure fair notice 
of the punishment at the time when the crime is committed, and to restrain 
“arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation”26 against the politically weakest 
members of society (like criminals and prisoners). 
Weaver is notable because it applied the Ex Post Facto Clause where the 
increase in punishment took the form of a delay in parole eligibility, despite the 
uncertainty as to whether or not the individual prisoner would in fact have been 
paroled.27 The Court said the inquiry is a facial one: it “looks to the challenged 
provision, and not to any special circumstances that may mitigate its effect on 
the particular individual.”28 Weaver, like Lindsey before it, viewed the question 
 
or quantum of evidence required as set forth in the Calder categories were not sufficient to make out an 
ex post facto claim); see supra notes 12–15 and accompanying text. 
 23. 450 U.S. 24 (1981). Weaver was a unanimous decision; the concurring Justices did not 
disagree with the majority’s analysis of the Ex Post Facto Clause but took issue only with whether the 
new statute in fact operated retrospectively, or whether its benefits (which for some prisoners could 
permit or speed up parole eligibility in new ways) might outweigh its harms enough to excuse what 
would otherwise be an ex post facto violation. See id. at 36–39. 
 24. Id. at 32. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 29. 
 27. Id. at 29–30. The Court continued: 
Evaluating whether a right has vested is important for claims under the Contracts or Due 
Process Clauses, which solely protect pre-existing entitlements. The presence or absence of 
an affirmative, enforceable right is not relevant, however, to the ex post facto prohibition, 
which forbids the imposition of punishment more severe than the punishment assigned by 
law when the act to be punished occurred. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 28. Id. at 33. But see Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 300 (1977) (suggesting that a defendant 
in a criminal case cannot bring an ex post facto claim “where the change has had no effect on the 
defendant in the proceedings of which he complains”). 
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as a pure question of law to be decided by the Court.29 If the statute under review 
might result in some prisoners serving longer sentences than they could have 
served when they committed their crimes, then retroactive application is barred 
by the Ex Post Facto Clause. It made no difference that Lindsey was a front-end 
sentencing case while Weaver was a back-end parole case because the interest 
and the harm were identical in both cases. 
Weaver, like Lindsey, sent a strong signal to the lower courts that almost 
any retroactive change that could delay prisoners’ release date renders their 
sentence “more onerous” and thus is prohibited by the Ex Post Facto Clause.30 
Based on Lindsey and Weaver, and despite the narrowing of the Ex Post Facto 
Clause that occurred in 1990 in Collins, from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s, 
numerous US circuit courts of appeal and state supreme courts struck down 
retroactive parole changes with such effects. These included not just changes in 
the substantive standard to obtain parole, but also arguably procedural changes 
or mixed changes that might be described as procedural or substantive, but which 
could still delay parole consideration or a prisoner’s release. Examples included 
less frequent parole review,31 loss of good time or other credits,32 increases in 
the minimum time to be served,33 and hurdles making it harder for prisoners to 
 
 29. Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 400 (1937); Weaver, 450 U.S. at 33. 
 30. Weaver, 450 U.S. at 36. 
 31. See, e.g., Roller v. Cavanaugh, 984 F.2d 120 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that changing parole 
review from annual to biennial review violates the Ex Post Facto Clause); Akins v. Snow, 922 F.2d 1558 
(11th Cir. 1991) (same, for changing annual parole review to review every eight years, following a parole 
denial); Watson v. Estelle, 859 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated on other grounds, 886 F.2d 1093 (9th 
Cir. 1989) (same, for extending parole review from every year to every three years); Rodriguez v. U.S. 
Parole Comm’n, 594 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1979) (same, for reducing opportunities for parole review under 
federal prison rules); see also Griffin v. State, 433 S.E.2d 862 (S.C. 1993) (holding that extending parole 
review from every year to every two years violates the Ex Post Facto Clause); Tiller v. Klincar, 561 
N.E.2d 576, 580 (Ill. 1990) (same, for changing parole review from every year to every three years 
because “the new law ‘constricts the inmate’s opportunity to earn early release, and thereby makes more 
onerous the punishment for crimes committed before its enactment’” (citing Weaver, 450 U.S. 24, 35–
36 (1981))). 
 32. See, e.g., Arnold v. Cody, 951 F.2d 280 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding that an emergency 
overcrowding credit statute amendment, which made it more difficult for prisoners who had been denied 
parole to obtain release, imposed an eligibility requirement which had not existed under the earlier 
statute and thus violated the Ex Post Facto Clause); Greenfield v. Scafati, 277 F. Supp. 644 (D. Mass. 
1967), aff’d, 390 U.S. 713 (1968) (affirming judgment of three-judge court that found an ex post facto 
violation in a statute that eliminated gain time for the first six months following parole revocation as 
applied to an inmate whose crime occurred before the law’s enactment). 
 33. Devine v. N.M. Dep’t of Corr., 866 F.2d 339, 342 (10th Cir. 1989) (unforeseeable judicial 
enlargement of a state criminal statute, raising the minimum term of defendant’s sentence from ten years 
to thirty years, applied retroactively, operates precisely like an ex post facto law; “[I]f a state legislature 
is barred by the Ex Post Facto Clause from passing such a law, . . . a State Supreme Court is barred by 
the Due Process Clause from achieving precisely the same result by judicial construction.”) (quoting 
Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353–54 (1964)); see also Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 
188, 192 (1977) (holding that retroactive imposition of criminal liability for conduct that was not 
previously criminal violates the Ex Post Facto Clause). 
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petition for review or leniency.34 And as in Lindsey and Weaver, the courts 
treated these issues as pure questions of law, to be decided by the court. By 1995, 
it was black-letter law that any significant change in the parole process that (a) 
applied retroactively, and (b) might delay a prisoner’s release, was close to a per 
se violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.35 
II. 
LATE TWENTIETH-CENTURY SUPREME COURT DOCTRINE 
A. Morales: A Modest Change of Course 
In 1995, in California Department of Corrections v. Morales,36 the US 
Supreme Court slightly tightened the parole ex post facto standard. In Morales, 
California had reduced the frequency of parole review for murderers who 
committed a second murder. California law still required an annual paper review, 
as well as an individualized finding that the delay in parole review would not 
harm the inmate’s chances for parole.37 On those limited, unusual facts, the Court 
held that the less frequent parole review was not a per se violation of the Ex Post 
Facto Clause. Rather, the test was whether, all things considered, the change 
 
 34. State v. Reynolds, 642 A.2d 1368 (N.H. 1994) (finding that changing the period for filing a 
petition for suspension of sentence from every two years to every four years violates the Ex Post Facto 
Clause). 
 35. As to ex post facto sentencing cases, the US Supreme Court has stayed the course that it set 
in Lindsey back in 1937. In Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 (1987), Florida had amended its sentencing 
guidelines between the time Miller had committed his crime and his sentence. The sentencing court 
applied the amended guidelines, raising Miller’s presumptive sentence; he was then sentenced to the 
new top end of the range. The Florida Supreme Court found no ex post facto violation, but the US 
Supreme Court unanimously reversed. Although it used the pre-Collins ex post facto test in its analysis, 
the Court found that the parole guidelines “directly and adversely” affected the sentence the defendant 
received, making “more onerous the punishment for crimes committed before [their] enactment.” Id. at 
435 (citing Weaver, 540 U.S. at 36). Miller, too, therefore survived Collins, because the change fit snugly 
within the third Calder category. See Cal. Dep’t of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 506 n.3 (1995) 
(discussed next in Part II.A). 
 36. 514 U.S. 499 (1995). 
 37. On these facts, the Ninth Circuit held: 
By increasing the interval between parole hearings, the state has denied Morales 
opportunities for parole that existed under prior law, thereby making the punishment for his 
crime greater than it was under the law in effect at the time his crime was committed. Logic 
dictates that because a prisoner cannot be paroled without first having a parole hearing, a 
parole hearing is a requirement for parole eligibility. Akins v. Snow, 922 F.2d 1558, 1562 
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1260 (1991). Accordingly, any retrospective law making 
parole hearings less accessible would effectively increase the sentence and violate the ex post 
facto clause. We base this conclusion on the Supreme Court’s observation that the denial of 
parole is a part of a defendant’s punishment. Warden v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 662 (1974). 
The [Supreme] Court went on to note that “a repealer of parole eligibility previously available 
to imprisoned offenders would clearly present the serious question under the ex post facto 
clause . . . .”  
Morales v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 16 F.3d 1001, 1004 (9th Cir. 1994) (parallel citations omitted). 
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“produces a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to 
the covered crimes.”38 
Morales was a narrow, practical decision. For obvious reasons, prisoners 
who are incarcerated for murder and who then commit a second murder are 
highly unlikely to be paroled, especially in the early years after the second 
homicide. So changing their in-person review from every year to every three 
years (and conducting an annual paper review instead, and making an 
individualized finding that the delayed review will not increase their risk of an 
erroneous parole denial, and preserving the board’s ability to shorten the period 
if warranted), is hardly a high-risk venture. The Morales Court rejected the 
prisoner’s argument that the legal standard should be “any conceivable risk of 
affecting a prisoner’s punishment.”39 The Court said that such an amorphous 
standard would necessarily include anything that “might create some 
speculative, attenuated risk of affecting a prisoner’s actual term of 
confinement,”40 even such petty changes as reduced access to the prison law 
library, or a slightly shorter parole hearing, or the replacement of an old parole 
board member by someone new.41 The Court distinguished such “attenuated” 
changes from the statute before it, which applied only to a very small number of 
prisoners, who were provided with several layers of protection, and who were 
highly unlikely to be paroled in any event. Morales was thus only the smallest 
step away from the universally accepted legal regime described above—that the 
Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits retroactive changes that might increase the time 
some prisoners would serve.42 
 
 38. Morales, 514 U.S. at 509. 
 39. Id. at 508. 
 40. Id. at 508–09. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Writing for the Court in Morales, Justice Thomas suggested that courts should be realistic 
about how parole boards use their limited resources. If multiple murderers are extremely unlikely to be 
paroled, and if the state screens such cases carefully to ensure that the modest increased interval between 
parole hearings will not delay cases that deserve to be heard, then no prisoners will be harmed and the 
board can concentrate on cases in which a real parole decision needs to be made. As the Court noted, 
“the evident focus of the California amendment was merely ‘to relieve the [Board] from the costly and 
time-consuming responsibility of scheduling parole hearings’ for prisoners who have no reasonable 
chance of being released.” Id. at 507 (citing In re Jackson, 703 P.2d 100, 106 (1985) and quoting 
legislative history). In dissent, Justice Stevens belittled the cost/burden rationale, noting that murderers 
who commit a second murder are a tiny class, of fiscal/resource insignificance. He argued that the state 
was more forthcoming in its own briefs, inviting “the Court to ‘reexamine’ its ex post facto jurisprudence 
‘[i]n view of the national trend towards the implementation of harsher penalties and conditions of con-
finement for offenders and inmates.’” Id. at 521 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court continued: 
The danger of legislative overreaching against which the Ex Post Facto Clause protects is 
particularly acute when the target of the legislation is a narrow group as unpopular (to put it 
mildly) as multiple murderers. There is obviously little legislative hay to be made in 
cultivating the multiple murderer vote. For a statute such as [the California amendment], 
therefore, the concerns that animate the Ex Post Facto Clause demand enhanced, and not (as 
the majority seems to believe) reduced, judicial scrutiny. 
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Indeed, just two years later, in 1997, in Lynce v. Mathis,43 the Court again 
held that the Ex Post Facto Clause applies to increased punishment in the form 
of the retroactive loss of opportunities for parole, citing with approval Weaver’s 
admonition that a “prisoner’s eligibility for reduced imprisonment is a significant 
factor entering into both the defendant’s decision to plea bargain and the judge’s 
calculation of the sentence to be imposed.”44 In Lynce, state law authorized the 
Department of Corrections (DOC) to award early release credits to prisoners 
when the prison population exceeded preset levels. A later statute canceled the 
credits for some offenders after the credits had been awarded, and in some cases 
after the prisoners had been released. 
The state tried to distinguish Weaver on the grounds that it had involved 
credits earned by the prisoner, rather than credits provided by the state to 
alleviate overcrowding. The Court dismissed that distinction: “[I]n Weaver, we 
relied not on the subjective motivation of the legislature in enacting 
the . . . credits, but rather on whether objectively the new statute ‘lengthen[ed] 
the period that someone in petitioner’s position must spend in prison.’”45 
In Lynce the Court made clear that the Ex Post Facto Clause forbids changes 
that retroactively reduce a prisoner’s opportunity for parole. This is so because 
the reduced opportunity includes the risk of a longer sentence for some prisoners, 
and because the defendant relies on the parole system in place when entering (or 
rejecting) a plea, and the judge relies on the parole system in place when 
determining what the sentence will be.46 The Court credited what prosecutors 
and criminal defense lawyers know in their bones—that the parole regime in 
place when a person commits a crime influences not just what will happen at the 
back end of the sentence, many years down the road, but also what happens at 
the front end, namely whether the defendant will plead guilty or go to trial, and 
what sentence the judge will impose. 
B. An Opening for Opponents of Parole Release 
But sometimes all it takes is a few words in an opinion to trigger a seismic 
shift. As noted above, before Morales (and even in Morales itself) the Supreme 
Court had decided its Ex Post Facto Clause cases as pure questions of law. Courts 
could read the new or amended statute, figure out if any prisoners to whom it 
 
Id. at 522. Justice Stevens was prescient in believing that acceptance of the state’s invitation would lead 
to longer sentences for all, retrospectively as well as prospectively. See infra notes 48–52 and 
accompanying text. 
 43. 519 U.S. 433 (1997). 
 44. Lynce, 519 U.S. at 445–46 (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 32 (1981)). Lynce 
came seven years after Collins, and thus necessarily the Court was applying a legal standard consistent 
with Calder and Collins. See id. at 441 n.13 (explaining that the law in question falls within the four 
Calder categories). 
 45. Id. at 442 (emphasis added) (quoting Weaver, 450 U.S. at 33). Here, too, the prisoner-
plaintiff did not have to prove that he would serve more time, but only that someone in the same position 
could suffer that fate under the amendment as written. 
 46. See Weaver, 450 U.S. at 32; Lynce, 519 U.S. at 445–46. 
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applied might serve longer sentences as a result of the law’s retroactive 
application, and, if the answer was yes, enjoin its retrospective use. Even Mor-
ales can be viewed as a straightforward application of this black-letter law. The 
Court simply said, on the unique facts of the California statute, that the risk of 
any prisoners ever serving a longer sentence (than they would have served but 
for the deferred parole review) was so remote as not to present an actionable ex 
post facto claim. 
The problem with Morales was not what it did, but what it insinuated with 
a few words that Justice Thomas wrote and the tone in which he wrote them. 
First, in disparaging the prisoner’s claim that the Ex Post Facto Clause forbids a 
change that has “any conceivable risk of affecting a prisoner’s punishment,” 
Thomas said that such an approach “would require that we invalidate any of a 
number of minor (and perhaps inevitable) mechanical changes that might 
produce some remote risk of impact on a prisoner’s expected term of confine-
ment. . . . [T]he judiciary would be charged under the Ex Post Facto Clause with 
the micromanagement of an endless array of legislative adjustments.”47 
Second, in responding to a comment in Justice Stevens’ dissent, Justice 
Thomas dropped a short footnote about the plaintiffs’ burden of persuasion in 
these cases. Justice Stevens had criticized the majority for saying that the 
prisoner’s claim of increased punishment was “speculative” because Stevens 
believed that the amended California law would “inevitably delay the grant of 
parole in some cases.”48 Stevens accused the majority of speculating about the 
accuracy of the board’s predictions, the suitability of an entire class of prisoners 
for parole in the future, and the length of time that would actually elapse between 
hearings (despite the board’s ability, in theory, to intercede early in exceptional 
cases). Justice Stevens further argued that “[t]o engage in such pure speculation 
while condemning respondent’s assertion of increased punishment as 
‘speculative’ seems to me not only unpersuasive, but actually perverse.”49 
In responding to this accusation, Justice Thomas said that Stevens’ 
suggestion that the speculation “should ru[n] in the other direction” (to favor the 
prisoner) “effectively shifts to the State the burden of persuasion.”50 Namely:  
[a]lthough we have held that a party asserting an ex post facto claim need 
not carry the burden of showing that he would have been sentenced to a 
lesser term under the [prior statutory scheme], we have never suggested that 
 
 47. Morales, 514 U.S. at 508. 
 48. Id. at 525 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens was concerned not so much with the prisoners’ 
delayed review in the early years. Rather, he feared that as time went by and prisoners approached the 
date when they would get serious board consideration, the less favorable schedule would surely result 
in delayed parole for some people. Id. In our view his concern was justified and prescient, given the 
holdings of later cases. See infra note 54. 
 49. Morales, 514 U.S. at 526. 
 50. Id. at 510 n.6 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
606 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  106:593 
the challenging party may escape the ultimate burden of establishing that the 
measure of punishment itself has changed.51 
Well, yes and no. Up to and including Morales, the Court’s exclusive focus 
had been on whether a retroactive law created a sufficient risk that some 
prisoners might serve more time than they would have served but for the change. 
This was treated as a question of law that the Court had decided without much 
input from the parties—and, if anything, the Court had given the benefit of the 
doubt to prisoners. As Justice Stevens noted, “In light of the importance that the 
Framers placed on the Ex Post Facto Clause, we have always enforced the 
prohibition against the retroactive enhancement scrupulously.”52 
Put another way, although the Court did not approach these cases from a 
burden-of-proof or burden-of-persuasion perspective, based on the Court’s 
decisions for decades, in practice the prisoners’ burden had been feather-like. All 
they had to show was a sufficient risk that, either at sentencing or at parole, some 
prisoners might serve more time as a result of the change in law. That was so 
because relief under the Ex Post Facto Clause, as the Court unanimously held in 
Weaver, is based not on an individual’s right to less punishment, but on the 
values the Clause was designed to protect—namely, to ensure fair notice of the 
punishment at the time when the crime is committed, and to restrain “arbitrary 
and potentially vindictive legislation,” especially against unpopular groups.53 
Not long after Morales was decided in 1995, however, the circuit courts of 
appeal were already reading the decision broadly, perhaps reflecting the “get-
tough-on-crime” mentality that was sweeping the country and that Justice 
Stevens had alluded to in his Morales dissent.54 
For example, in Shabazz v. Gabry,55 the Sixth Circuit reviewed a facial 
attack on a law that reduced the frequency of in-person parole interviews for 
parolable lifers from the fourth year of incarceration and every two years 
thereafter, to the tenth year and every five years thereafter. The change came on 
the heels of the election of a new governor and legislative majority who had run 
in part on a “law and order” platform. 56 
 
 51. Id. (citation omitted). 
 52. Id. at 516. 
 53. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981). 
 54. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 521–22 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 55. 123 F.3d 909 (6th Cir. 1997). We focus on the Sixth Circuit here because it is our home 
circuit. We know its cases best, but we also think its cases are representative (full disclosure: the authors’ 
clinical law program was counsel of record in some of these cases). Accord Ellis v. Norris, 232 F.3d 619 
(8th Cir. 2000) (holding a statute that gave prison officials discretion to award additional good-time 
credits did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause); Roller v. Gunn, 107 F.3d 227 (4th Cir. 1997) (same 
regarding amendment reducing the frequency of parole reconsideration hearings); Hamm v. Latessa, 72 
F.3d 947 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding a statutory amendment excluding inmates with “from-and-after” 
sentences from parole board hearings did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause). 
 56. MICH. DEP’T OF CORR., FIVE YEARS AFTER: AN ANALYSIS OF THE MICHIGAN PAROLE 
BOARD SINCE 1992 2 (1997). In 1992, Governor Engler’s intent in overhauling the state’s Parole Board 
was to “make Michigan’s communities safer by making more criminals serve more time and keeping 
many more locked up for as long as possible.” Id. 
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The Michigan law was implemented with none of the protections provided 
in Morales. Over 800 qualified parolable lifers got blanket notices that their next 
scheduled review would be deferred by three years (to implement a new five-
year review schedule), no matter how long the prisoners had served or how close 
the board’s vote to deny parole had been at their last previous review. Thereafter, 
they would be reviewed for parole only every five years. The change did not 
include any individualized assessment of the prisoners. This was a classic 
“retroactive change” that before Morales unquestionably would have been struck 
down under the Ex Post Facto Clause. 
But the Sixth Circuit held, “The Morales test requires a showing of 
sufficient risk of increased punishment, not merely ‘some ambiguous sort of 
“disadvantage”’ suffered by an inmate.”57 The court found that the plaintiffs had 
not proven that the postponement of review (in and of itself) necessarily 
produced a “sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to 
the covered crimes.”58 
C. Garner v. Jones: A Wrong Turn Initiated 
The Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of Morales got a big boost from the 
Supreme Court in 2000 in Garner v. Jones.59 In Garner, Georgia had reduced 
the frequency of parole review from every third year to every eighth year for 
lifers who had previously been denied parole. In finding an ex post facto 
violation, the Eleventh Circuit had distinguished the Georgia rule from the 
California law upheld in Morales because: 
 
 57. Shabazz, 123 F.3d at 914. The Sixth Circuit’s phrasing drew on the Supreme Court’s 
rejection in Collins of the Kring and Thompson line of cases, which held generally that a mere 
“disadvantage” was insufficient to support an ex post facto claim, thus restoring the exclusivity of the 
four Calder categories. Id. at 912. In doing so, however, the Sixth Circuit ignored the import of the 
Court’s parole ex post facto cases—namely, that Weaver had survived Collins despite relying on the 
“disadvantaged” rationale, and that Lynce had been decided in the prisoners’ favor (unanimously) after 
Collins. Both decisions were based not on a hypothetical or attenuated disadvantage, but on the Court 
having found that some prisoners might well wind up serving longer sentences—which is all the Court 
had ever required in the context of sentencing or parole. 
 58. Id. The court noted that “no reliable statistical analysis was available . . . because the statute 
had been in effect for too short a period.” Id. The Sixth Circuit said that the district court had erred in 
relying on “anecdotal observations and personal speculation to conclude that the amendments may 
present sufficient risk of increased punishment.” Id. at 914–15 (emphasis added). Based on the limited 
data available (from 1993 to 1995), the court of appeals found that the prisoners had failed to prove that 
the delay in parole hearings would inevitably lead to delayed paroles. 
 59. 529 U.S. 244 (2000). For another case in the same term that was more amenable to an ex 
post facto claim and that reinvigorated the Calder analysis, see Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513 (2000). 
That case was decided a few months after Garner, and, in finding an ex post facto violation, it 
characterized Collins as defining the fourth category in Calder, instead of eliminating it, as some had 
suggested. Carmell overturned a conviction obtained on the testimony of a child victim alone, which 
was not allowed under the law in effect when the crime was committed. The Court said that the 
amendment was “unquestionably a law ‘that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or 
different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to 
convict the offender,’” citing Calder’s fourth category of forbidden retroactive changes. Id. at 530. 
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[T]he set of inmates affected by the retroactive change [namely all 
prisoners serving life sentences] is ‘bound to be far more sizeable than 
the set [of murderers who commit a new murder] . . . at issue in 
Morales.’ . . . The Georgia law sweeps within its coverage . . . ‘many 
inmates who can expect at some point to be paroled,’ and thus ‘seems 
certain to ensure that some number of inmates will find the length of 
their incarceration extended in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.’”60 
The Supreme Court nevertheless reversed. It reiterated that retroactive 
parole changes fall within the ex post facto prohibition if they create “a sufficient 
risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes.”61 
Although the Garner Court acknowledged that the requisite risk could be 
inherent in the text authorizing the change, the Court held that less frequent 
review alone did not make the risk self-evident, “and it ha[d] not otherwise been 
demonstrated on the record.”62 
One would think (as the Eleventh Circuit had found, and as Justice Souter 
argued in dissent in Garner)63 that if nearly all parole review for a large class of 
prisoners is postponed from every three years to every eight years, then surely 
some prisoners would serve longer sentences than they would have served under 
the previous, more generous review schedule. This would be especially true the 
longer the new rule remained in place. Over time, more and more prisoners 
would approach the date when the board might well view them as good 
candidates for parole, yet most would still be reviewed only every eight years 
instead of every three years. Statistically, it seems all but certain that some 
prisoners would serve more time than they would have served but for the 
retroactive-deferred review.64 
But in Garner, writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy played down the 
specifics of the California law that controlled the outcome in Morales and played 
 
 60. Garner, 529 U.S. at 249 (citations omitted) (citing Jones v. Garner, 164 F.3d 589, 594–95 
(11th Cir. 1999)). 
 61. Id. at 250 (citing Cal. Dep’t of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 509 (1995)); see also Robert 
A. Renjel, Garner v. Jones: Restricting Prisoners’ Ex Post Facto Challenges to Changes in Parole 
Systems, 52 MERCER L. REV. 761, 772–75 (2001) (discussing Garner and interpreting it to mean that 
the prisoner must show a “sufficient risk of increased punishment” and noting that the Court did not 
address the evidence required to make this showing). 
 62. Garner, 529 U.S. at 251. 
 63. Id. at 261 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 64. Justice Souter emphasized this very point in his dissent. Id. at 260–61. Justice Souter 
explained: 
Before the board changed its reconsideration Rule, a prisoner would receive a second 
consideration for parole by year 10, whereas now the second consideration must occur only 
by year 15; those who would receive a third consideration at year 13 will now have no certain 
consideration until year 23, and so on. . . . If a prisoner who would have been paroled on his 
fourth consideration in year 16 under the old Rule has to wait until his third consideration in 
year 23 under the new Rule, his punishment has been increased regardless of the average. 
Id. We think he is right. In any other context it is hard to imagine that a similar blanket delay of 
discretionary decision-making—where a decision is necessary in order to get the sought-after benefit—
would be assumed to have a benign effect. 
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up the language that counseled a hands-off approach to all parole-related 
discretionary decisions. Justice Kennedy also paid homage to the specter of 
“micromanagement” and said that “[s]tates must have due flexibility in 
formulating parole procedures and addressing problems associated with 
confinement and release.”65 The Court relied heavily on two important 
qualifications in the Georgia parole law. One gave the board discretion to shorten 
the eight-year period for worthy candidates, and the other permitted expedited 
review if new information warranted it. (There was no record of whether the 
board in fact did either.) 
Garner also went well beyond Morales with regard to the prisoner’s 
burden. Without citation, the Garner Court said, “In the case before us, 
respondent must show that as applied to his own sentence the law created a 
significant risk of increasing his punishment.”66 To the contrary, as noted above, 
in order to make out an ex post facto violation in the past, the Court had only 
required a finding that some prisoners might serve longer sentences due to the 
retroactive application of the new or changed law.67 
In Garner the Court was also unclear about whether proof as to others 
would suffice. It said that the board’s “policy statements, along with [its] actual 
practices, provide important instruction as to how the Board interprets its 
enabling statute and regulations, and therefore whether, as a matter of fact, the 
amendment . . . created a significant risk.”68 Accordingly, “[w]hen the rule does 
not by its own terms show a significant risk, the [inmate] must demonstrate, by 
evidence drawn from the rule’s practical implementation by the agency charged 
with exercising discretion, that its retroactive application will result in a longer 
period of incarceration than under the earlier rule.”69 The Court remanded the 
case to give the prisoner the chance to make a factual record.70 
 
 65. Id. at 252 (majority opinion). Avoiding micromanagement and granting flexibility are 
appropriate where retroactive changes create little or no risk of longer sentences. But if the purpose of 
the Ex Post Facto Clause is to prevent states from increasing after the fact the amount of time that 
prisoners serve, then the focus should be not on the level of intrusion exercised by the courts—which 
might well be a valid concern in prison conditions cases—but rather on the effect of the change in the 
law. See infra Part IV. As the Court itself noted, “The presence of discretion does not displace the 
protections of the Ex Post Facto Clause.” Garner, 529 U.S. at 253. 
 66. Id. at 255. 
 67. The one possible exception was the case of criminal appeals. See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 
U.S. 282, 300–01 (holding that there can be no ex post facto violation where the change in law “had no 
effect on the defendant in the proceedings of which he complains.”). But Garner was a Section 1983 
action, which challenged the retroactive parole laws and policies directly. It is hard to see why it would 
be viewed as an “as applied” challenge as opposed to a facial challenge, given the legal standard used 
by the Court in Weaver, Lynce, and Morales. 
 68. Garner, 529 U.S. at 256. 
 69. Id. at 255. In this sentence, the Court conspicuously omitted for whom the longer period of 
incarceration must be demonstrated—the prisoner bringing the claim or any prisoners subject to the 
same regime. 
 70. Id. at 256–57. 
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III. 
POST-GARNER: WRONG TURN COMPLETED 
A. Garner’s Reading by the Courts of Appeal 
A number of circuit cases show how far the pendulum swung after Garner. 
In Dyer v. Bowlen,71 a state parole board denied parole based on the new (stricter) 
substantive standard that was in effect at the time of the prisoner’s parole hearing 
rather than on the old (more lenient) standard that was in effect when the prisoner 
had committed his crimes more than twenty years before.72 The prisoner was 
denied relief in the state courts, and he then filed a federal habeas petition, which 
he lost. Again, one would think that this would be an easy case for an ex post 
facto violation because the substantive standard for parole had changed to the 
prisoner’s disadvantage. But, citing Garner, the Sixth Circuit held that the only 
way to be sure if the change amounted to an ex post facto violation was to vacate 
and remand the case for additional fact-finding.73 The court said: 
Intuitively, the retroactive application of new parole statutes . . . might 
effectuate a sufficient risk of increased punishment, but the ultimate 
result depends upon how the parole board actually exercises its 
discretion. . . . [T]he Supreme Court has made clear that in order for us 
to conduct the necessary ex post facto inquiry, we must determine 
whether [the prisoner] has produced specific evidence of a sufficient 
risk of increased punishment.74 
The court conceded that under the Garner standard the plaintiff need not show 
that he “actually received a more serious punishment,” but only that he suffered 
the requisite risk.75 
A third illustrative Sixth Circuit case is Foster v. Booker.76 In Foster, the 
plaintiffs were parolable lifers who historically had been paroled at roughly the 
 
 71. 465 F.3d 280 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 72. The two changes highlighted by the appellate court were that the new standard placed an 
importance on the seriousness of the offense unrelated to the offender’s rehabilitative efforts, which had 
not been part of the earlier standard, and that the new standard provided that if conditions were met, the 
board “may” grant parole, whereas the earlier standard had stated that the board “shall” grant parole. Id. 
at 282–83. 
 73. A dissenting judge in Dyer agreed that the case should be vacated but said that remand for 
fact-finding was unnecessary. In the dissent’s view, the change violated the Ex Post Facto Clause on its 
face. The dissent would have remanded for the board to “make its determination under substantive 
criteria no more onerous than those applicable at the time of [the] crime.” Id. at 295 (Rogers, J., 
dissenting). 
 74. Id. at 286 (majority opinion). 
 75. Id. at 288; cf. Richardson v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. and Parole, 423 F.3d 282, 292 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(holding that an ex post facto violation was not established because the inmate failed to prove that the 
new law created a significant risk of increasing his punishment). 
 76. 595 F.3d 353 (6th Cir. 2010). Note that in the trial court, the pleadings were titled Foster-
Bey v. Rubitschun, but Westlaw reported the district court’s decision as Bey v. Rubitschun, 2007 WL 
7705668 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 23, 2007), which reverted to Foster v. Booker on appeal, by which time a 
new “official capacity” state defendant had been substituted into the case. 
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same time as prisoners who had committed similar crimes but were given long 
indeterminate sentences.77 As noted above,78 after Michigan elected a conser-
vative new governor and legislature, the new administration amended the parole 
laws to abolish the existing parole board and to give the governor authority to 
appoint a new board.79 The new board quickly adopted a “life means life” policy 
(even though the ostensible substantive standard for parole had not changed), 
with the result that release rates for parolable lifers—which had already declined 
sharply due to parole-board resource issues and a mushrooming prison 
population—fell to microscopic levels compared to long-term historical 
averages.80 The board also stopped treating parolable lifers and long 
indeterminate prisoners the same in making its parole decisions.81 
The Sixth Circuit nevertheless reversed the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment in the prisoners’ favor. The court held that any risk of more 
onerous punishment could be attributed to the changes in the board’s exercise of 
its discretion. Citing Garner, the court stated, “[T]he most that can be said here 
is that, based on experience, the new Board’s discretion was informed and then 
exercised in a way that made it more difficult for plaintiffs to secure release on 
parole.”82 Ultimately, the Foster court required that in order for prisoner-
 
 77. Foster, 595 F.3d at 360. The parole board sought parity because in Michigan most serious 
felonies are punishable by “life or any term of years.” See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.529 (2004) 
(imposing “life or any term of years” for armed robbery). Due to an anomaly in the state’s parole law 
and practice, parole eligibility could actually be attained sooner under the lifer law than on a long indeter-
minate sentence. As a result, for decades many defendants requested, and many judges imposed, a life 
sentence in order to give well-behaved prisoners the chance for an earlier parole. The board therefore 
viewed lifers and long indeterminate prisoners alike. See Bey, 2007 WL 7705668, at *4, *13–14. 
 78. See supra Part II.B and note 55 (discussing Shabazz v. Gabry, 123 F.3d 909 (6th Cir. 1997)). 
 79. Foster, 595 F.3d at 363. The plaintiffs in Foster challenged the cumulative effect of a series 
of statutory and policy changes that the plaintiffs said created the requisite risk of delayed release as 
applied retroactively to the class. The changes included not just delaying parole review for lifers (which 
was challenged in Shabazz) but also included eliminating mandatory in-person interviews after the first 
review and substituting paper (file) reviews; increasing the size of the parole board from seven to ten 
members (but still requiring a majority vote for lifer paroles); taking the parole board out of civil service 
and thus eliminating board tenure and substituting four-year terms; firing the existing, nonpartisan board 
and replacing it with the governor’s political appointees (who came mostly from law enforcement and 
prosecutors’ offices); requiring that a majority of the board members have no past connection to the 
Department of Corrections (when in the past nearly all board members had come from the DOC); and 
eliminating prisoners’ right to appeal an adverse parole decision to court while granting such a right to 
the prosecutor and the victim. See Bey, 2007 WL 7705668, at *4 (summarizing the statutory changes). 
As to delayed parole review, the district court found that, in practice, the board almost never reduced the 
longer period of review. Some board members were unaware they could even do so. Id. at *17–18. 
 80. Id. at *19–23 (discussing the district court’s factual findings). 
 81. Id. at *11 (“Representatives of the Parole Board from the years leading up to 1992 
consistently testified that nonmandatory lifers were treated the same as prisoners serving long 
indeterminate sentences . . . for purposes of parole, whereas now the board aligns nonmandatory lifers 
with mandatory lifers.”); id. at *13–14. 
 82. Foster, 595 F.3d at 364. But as noted above, Garner also held that the mere fact that a board 
decision is discretionary “does not displace the protections of the Ex Post Facto Clause,” because there 
is always the “danger that legislatures might disfavor certain persons after the fact . . . even in the parole 
context.” Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 253 (2000). 
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plaintiffs to prevail, they must prove that any adverse changes could not be 
accounted for by how the board exercises its discretion—a standard that is nearly 
impossible to meet in any discretionary setting.83 
An even more extreme example is the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Burnette 
v. Fahey.84 In Burnette, Virginia had ended indeterminate sentencing and parole 
(both prospectively) in 1995. From that date forward, the parole board only dealt 
with prisoners who had been sentenced under the prior parole regime. But after 
1995 the board also changed its internal parole policies and practices. It ceased 
using risk-assessment instruments; it stopped interviewing prisoners and instead 
farmed out parole review to nonboard parole examiners; and it mostly stopped 
meeting as a board and instead voted electronically.85 Before the changes, the 
board had relied on fourteen factors listed in its policy manual in making the 
parole decisions. After the changes, the board relied on “the serious nature and 
circumstances of the crime”—something the prisoner cannot change no matter 
how long the prisoner serves—to deny parole in 45 percent of the cases (95 
percent in geriatric cases),86 even when the other factors in the board’s manual 
or in the statute favored release. Parole rates for violent felonies dropped 
precipitously—initially from over 40 percent to below 20 percent, and then (from 
2002 to 2008) to around 3 percent.87 In other words, these prisoners were some 
thirteen or fourteen times less likely to be granted parole than before the changes. 
Prisoners with violent felonies typically served about 38 percent of their sentence 
before the changes, but afterward, of the much smaller group who were paroled, 
many had served 85 percent of their sentence.88 
On these facts, the district court granted the state’s motion to dismiss based 
on the pleadings alone, without discovery. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Citing 
the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Foster, the Fourth Circuit said that the prisoners 
 
 83. Foster contrasts sharply with Mickens-Thomas v. Vaughn (Mickens-Thomas I), 321 F.3d 
374 (3d Cir. 2003), one of the rare post-Garner cases in which the prisoner prevailed. In Mickens-
Thomas I, the Pennsylvania parole board had changed its parole criteria (based on a statutory amend-
ment) to make “concern for public safety” the overriding factor for parole. Id. at 380. The predictable 
result was that violent offenders got far less sympathetic review, and the number of paroles plummeted. 
Id. The Third Circuit conducted a thorough review of all the evidence, including statements by the board 
before and after the change, and statistical data comparing release rates before and after the change. The 
court concluded that the board “mistakenly construed [the statutory change] to signify a substantive 
change in its parole function.” Id. at 391. The court found that the change—as applied retroactively in a 
habeas case—violated the Ex Post Facto Clause, and it remanded to the board with instructions to 
reconsider the prisoner’s case under the former standard. The prisoner had served over forty years, and 
his original mandatory life sentence had been commuted by the governor (based on the recommendation 
of an earlier board). When on remand the board again denied parole, the Third Circuit found that the 
board had failed to comply with the court’s mandate and instead had again used the very factor that 
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. Mickens-Thomas v. Vaughn (Mickens-Thomas II), 355 F.3d 294 (3d 
Cir. 2004). The court issued a writ of habeas corpus granting the prisoner his unconditional release. Id. 
 84. 687 F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 85. Id. at 176. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 176–77. 
 88. Id. 
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had failed to prove that the parole rates could not have occurred just by changes 
in the way the board exercised its discretion: 
[T]he de facto abolition of discretionary parole . . . is at the crux of the 
Inmates’ complaint. . . . [I]t is implausible based on the facts alleged that 
the Board has adopted any such policy. The factual allegations suggest 
that the Board has become harsher with respect to violent offenses, but 
they do not indicate that the Board has implemented a de facto pro-
hibition of parole for persons convicted of [violent] offenses. In the 
absence of such facts, we cannot reasonably infer that the Board is 
failing to exercise its discretion as required by state law.89 
This is an exceedingly odd statement of an ex post facto claim. Prisoners do 
not have to prove that the parole board has “de facto [abolished] discretionary 
parole,” but only have to demonstrate a “sufficient risk” of increased punish-
ment.90 Compared to cases like Weaver and Lynce—where the plaintiffs 
prevailed on their ex post facto claims because some prisoners might plausibly 
spend more time in prison than before the changes took effect—the claim in the 
Virginia case seems like the easiest of calls (in the prisoners’ favor). The plain-
tiffs showed that their chances for parole were reduced by around 93 percent 
(from a parole rate of over 40 percent to a 3 percent parole rate in the years before 
and after the 1995 changes, respectively).91 As Garner made clear, the issue in 
ex post facto cases is not whether the board is exercising discretion, but how it is 
exercising its discretion, in the real world, on the ground.92 Burnette is especially 
striking because the prisoner-plaintiffs were never given the chance to conduct 
discovery or demonstrate how the board was exercising its discretion. 
B. Coda on the Ex Post Facto Clause at Sentencing 
Peugh v. U.S., a 2013 front-end sentencing case that relies on Weaver, 
Morales, and Garner, deserves special attention.93 In Peugh, the US Supreme 
Court had to decide if changes to the federal sentencing guidelines violated the 
Ex Post Facto Clause.94 When Mr. Peugh committed his crime, his guideline 
range was thirty to thirty-seven months.95 By the time he was sentenced, 
however, changes in the guideline scoring system had raised his range to seventy 
 
 89. Id. at 185 (citing Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 256 (2000)). 
 90. See Burnette, 687 F.3d at 185; Garner, 529 U.S. at 250. 
 91. See Burnette, 687 F.3d at 176–77. 
 92. See Garner, 529 U.S. at 256. 
 93. 569 U.S. 530 (2013); see also Cal. Dep’t of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 508 (1995) 
(suggesting parallel application of the Ex Post Facto Clause to sentencing and parole when the Court 
stated that it was concerned “with the micromanagement of an endless array of legislative adjustments 
to parole and sentencing procedures”). 
 94. Peugh, 569 U.S. at 530; see also Andrew C. Adams, One-Book, Two Sentences: Ex Post 
Facto Considerations of the One-Book Rule after United States v. Kumar, 39 AM. J. CRIM. L. 231, 245 
(2012) (describing a circuit split in application of the US Sentencing Guidelines at that time). 
 95. Peugh, 569 U.S. at 533. 
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to eighty-seven months.96 He argued that the change was a textbook ex post facto 
violation. The government argued that the guidelines were not “laws” covered 
by the Ex Post Facto Clause,97 because after U.S. v. Booker98 the guidelines were 
only advisory: they could not “control” the defendant’s sentence, which re-
mained at the discretion of the trial court. The district court and the Seventh 
Circuit agreed and found no constitutional violation. 
The Supreme Court reversed (5–4), noting that: 
Each of the parties can point to prior decisions of this Court that lend 
support to its view. On the one hand, we have never accepted the 
proposition that a law must increase the maximum sentence for which a 
defendant is eligible in order to violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. 
Moreover, the fact that the sentencing authority exercises some measure 
of discretion will also not defeat an ex post facto claim. On the other 
hand, we have made it clear that mere speculation or conjecture that a 
change in law will retrospectively increase the punishment for a crime 
will not suffice to establish a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. The 
touchstone of this Court’s inquiry is whether a given change in law 
presents a “sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment 
attached to the covered crimes.” The question when a change in law 
creates such a risk is “a matter of degree”; the test cannot be reduced to 
a “single formula.”99 
The Court held that because “[t]he federal system adopts procedural measures 
intended to make the [g]uidelines the lodestone of sentencing. . . . A retrospective 
 
 96. Id. at 534. 
 97. This argument resurfaced a debate as to whether the Ex Post Facto Clause applies only to 
statutes (“any ex post facto . . . Law”) or also applies to other regulations, rules, or policies that might or 
might not be binding upon the parole board or other state authorities. Before Garner, most courts had 
extended the Ex Post Facto Clause to formal rules and regulations that have the force and effect of law, 
and that are binding on the state officials who administer them. See, e.g., Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 
848, 854 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that more onerous parole regulation violated the Ex Post Facto Clause 
and that the term “laws” includes “‘every form in which the legislative power . . . is exerted,’ including 
‘a regulation or order’”); Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that the Ex Post Facto 
Clause does not apply to guidelines that do not create mandatory rules for release but are promulgated 
simply to guide the parole board in the exercise of its discretion). After Garner, some courts extended 
the Ex Post Facto Clause to informal rules or practices that influence or control decision-making in 
practice. See, e.g., Michael v. Ghee, 498 F.3d 372, 383 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that, for ex post facto 
purposes, the issue is not whether the parole guideline is a law but whether the challenged “guidelines 
present a significant risk of increasing the plaintiff’s amount of time actually served”); Fletcher v. Dist. 
of Columbia, 391 F.3d 250, 251 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (noting that the Supreme Court in Garner has 
“foreclosed our categorical distinction between a measure with the force of law and ‘guidelines [that] 
are merely policy statements,’” holding that either can be the source of an ex post facto violation) 
(citation omitted); Mickens-Thomas v. Vaughn, 355 F.3d 381, 384 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding that parole 
policies can be the source of an ex post facto violation). Both Garner and Peugh lean heavily toward 
the more liberal view, though that view may have its limits. See, e.g., Peugh, 569 U.S. at 556 (Thomas, 
J., dissenting) (“It is difficult to see how an advisory Guideline, designed to lead courts to impose 
sentences more in line with fixed statutory objectives, could ever constitute an ex post facto violation.”). 
 98. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 99. Peugh, 569 U.S. at 539 (citations omitted). 
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increase in the [g]uidelines range . . . creates a sufficient risk of a higher sentence 
to constitute an ex post facto violation.”100 
The Peugh majority obviously viewed its opinion as a straightforward 
application of the general ex post facto standard set forth in Lindsey, Morales, 
and Garner. But unlike in the back-end parole cases post-Garner, to prevail Mr. 
Peugh had to prove only that the new procedures and scoring rules created a 
“sufficient risk” of a higher sentence.101 In short, while Peugh strongly supports 
our view that there is a unitary ex post facto standard that applies to all cases in 
theory, Peugh also highlights how sentencing cases and parole cases are treated 
differently in reality. In Peugh, the judge’s discretion in applying the guidelines 
was not determinative, in sharp contrast to the Garner-based cases, like Foster 
and Burnette, where the board’s discretion was fatal to the plaintiffs’ claim. If 
the Supreme Court applied the Ex Post Facto Clause to parole in the same way 
that it applied the clause to sentencing (in Peugh), then it is hard to see how 
Garner (and consequently cases like Foster and Burnette) would not come out 
the other way. 
To sum up, over the last twenty-plus years—from Morales in 1995 to 
today—the legal standard to be applied in ex post facto parole cases turned 180 
degrees from what it had been for the fifty-plus years before Morales. It went 
from a regime in which any retroactive change that might harm prisoners’ 
opportunity for parole was treated as close to a per se ex post facto violation, to 
a regime in which almost no retroactive change in a parole statute, regulation, or 
policy can ever rise to the level of an ex post facto violation. The burden of 
persuasion also switched from a near presumption that any retroactive change 
that might delay parole consideration violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, to a near 
presumption that anything having to do with parole is effectively unchallenge-
able because it involves the exercise of discretion. Under current ex post facto 
doctrine, in practice the prisoner must show that other prisoners’ (or even the 
individual plaintiff’s) delayed release is all but certain, and must prove that 
changes in how the board exercises its discretion could not account for the 
delayed consideration or release.102 
 
 100. Id. at 544. 
 101. The proof was easy in his case because he was in fact sentenced to the top of the new range. 
Id. at 534. 
 102. For example, in Foster the prisoners produced evidence showing (1) that the changes were 
proposed and implemented to make current violent felons serve longer prison terms, (2) that in practice 
parolable lifers were being evaluated under a harsher substantive standard than before, and (3) that 
parolable lifers were released at record low levels in the decade after the change. Bey v. Rubitschun, No. 
05-71318, 2007 WL 7705668, at *10–15, *19–23 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 23, 2007) (factual findings of the 
district court). But that still wasn’t enough for the prisoners to prevail in the Sixth Circuit. 
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IV. 
IDENTIFYING THE WRONG TURN AND GETTING BACK ON THE RIGHT TRACK 
In this section, we diagnose how the wrong turn occurred, and we propose 
a fix that we think is consistent not just with Supreme Court case law, but also 
with the history and purpose of the Ex Post Facto Clause, and with the 
practicalities of litigation brought by prisoner-plaintiffs who lack the resources 
of other litigants. 
Several errors have given rise to the wrong turn. First, courts have glossed 
over the fact that some ex post facto claims are easy or obvious violations on the 
face of the changed statute, regulation, rule, or policy, or in its operation, while 
other ex post facto claims require additional proofs to determine if the claim has 
merit. Second, courts (in applying Morales and Garner) have misanalyzed the 
role and relevance of “discretionary” decision-making. Third, based on the 
sparse language of Garner, lower courts have imposed burdens in ex post facto 
cases that are inconsistent with the purpose of the clause, are contrary to the 
Court’s own analysis in Weaver, Morales, and Lynce, as well as in Peugh, and 
are impossible to meet given the realities facing prisoner-plaintiffs in the courts. 
A. Distinguishing Two Categories of Ex Post Facto Claims 
Having already fingered Garner as the primary source of the wrong turn on 
the Ex Post Facto Clause, we think a closer look at Garner is warranted. First, 
we note that Garner left one crucial aspect of previous ex post facto law 
undisturbed. Before Garner, the Court had typically treated ex post facto claims 
as presenting questions of law that could be resolved by looking at the language 
or the operational effect of the statute, regulation, rule, or policy that was the 
source of the alleged change. Weaver had made the clearest statement of this 
approach: 
Whether a retrospective state criminal statute ameliorates or worsens 
conditions imposed by its predecessor is a federal question. The inquiry 
looks to the challenged provision, and not to any special circumstances 
that may mitigate its effect on the particular individual.103 
Garner did not change or reject this analysis. In fact, Garner’s language 
reinforces that a category of ex post facto claims exists where the courts should 
need to look only to the law, regulation, rule, or policy that is being challenged 
in order to determine whether, as a matter of law, there is a “sufficient risk of 
increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes.”104 We 
agree that where the risk of a longer sentence is apparent, or is predictable with 
reasonable certainty, then the plaintiff should win under the Ex Post Facto Clause 
as a matter of law. We will refer to this first group as “per se” ex post facto claims 
 
 103. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 33 (1981) (citations omitted). 
 104. Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 250 (2000). 
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because nothing more is required for the trial court to determine that the risk of 
increased punishment is sufficiently high.105 
As to cases where the risk is not apparent or predictable from the text or 
operation of the statute, regulation, rule, or policy, Garner says: 
the [plaintiff] must demonstrate, by evidence drawn from the rule’s 
practical implementation by the agency charged with exercising 
discretion, that its retroactive application will result in a longer period 
of incarceration than under the earlier rule.106 
Thus, while recognizing the familiar category of historical amendments or 
changes of the sort presented in Lindsey, Weaver, Morales, and Lynce—all 
classic “per se” cases—Garner also implicitly admits a second category of cases 
where the effect of the changes cannot be readily discerned or predicted by the 
text or overt operation of the changed law or policy. In these cases, factual devel-
opment is needed to determine whether or not there is an ex post facto 
violation.107 We will refer to this second group as “possible” ex post facto claims. 
Though we see Garner as allowing for both kinds of ex post facto cases—
“per se” and “possible” cases—we disagree, as noted above, with the Court’s 
holding that the facts of Garner fall into what we are calling the second 
“possible” group. Let’s look again at the change: review of potential parolees 
was deferred from every three years to every eight years; the change covered all 
parolable lifers who had been denied parole at least once before; and the new 
review schedule had no time limit (meaning that prisoners whose likelihood of 
parole increased with the passing years would still be reviewed only every eight 
years forever into the future). The change was applied wholesale against a large 
class of prisoners and lacked the extra procedural protections guaranteed by the 
California statute in Morales (which included not just an annual paper review, 
but also a particularized finding that the two-year delay would not harm the indi-
vidual prisoner). As in the Sixth Circuit’s Foster case, the delay was not tied to 
how close the board’s vote had been in the previous review, or how much time 
the prisoner had served.108 We think that when legislators or prison authorities 
change the normative rules of parole sufficiently to result in the likely delayed 
release of some prisoners over time, that alone should be sufficient to meet the 
traditional legal standard under the Ex Post Facto Clause as a matter of law, in 
line with Weaver, Morales, and Lynce. We view Garner as squarely such a “per 
se” case. 
 
 105. The same would be true for a losing case, where it is facially obvious or easily predictable 
that the alleged risk is too low, and the plaintiff should lose as a matter of law. 
 106. Garner, 529 U.S. at 255. 
 107. See id. 
 108. As noted in the Foster case, the delayed review became so routine over time that some board 
members were unaware that the review period could be shortened. See supra notes 76–82 and 
accompanying text. 
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By implicitly holding that deferral of parole review for five years for all 
lifers was not a “per se” case, the Court blurred the bright line that had been set 
in Weaver, Lynce, and Morales. As a result, even core “per se” cases (like Dyer 
v. Bowlen, where the parole board had applied a new harsher substantive parole 
standard retroactively, yet the Sixth Circuit still thought it had to “get more facts” 
and remanded the case for discovery) are being viewed by the lower courts as 
“possible” cases, contrary to Weaver, Lynce, and Morales (and contrary to the 
rationale of Peugh). Yet in each of those four cases the same argument could 
have been made; namely, that you cannot know for sure what the effect will be 
until you see it played out. The takeaway of Weaver, Lynce, Morales, and Peugh, 
however, is that where the risk of increased punishment is sufficiently clear on 
the face of the change, that is enough to make out an ex post facto claim, and 
nothing more is required. 
Moreover, to do otherwise—as Garner (perhaps inadvertently) has 
encouraged the lower courts to do—thwarts the purpose of the Ex Post Facto 
Clause. The Framers viewed the Clause as a bulwark against vindictive legisla-
tures109 and ex post facto laws as “contrary to the first principles of the social 
compact.”110 From the early nineteenth century, the Supreme Court recognized 
that the Ex Post Facto Clause protects people from legislatures (or policy-
makers, in modern parlance) inflamed by the “feelings of the moment” or subject 
to “sudden and strong passions.”111 Indeed, in Weaver, the Court (unanimously) 
noted that the clause not only ensures notice to the public of crimes and 
punishments, but also serves to protect disfavored groups from such vindictive 
changes, and promotes separation of powers by making legislatures the authors 
of prospective criminal laws and courts the enforcers of those laws after they are 
passed.112 
B. The Red Herring of Discretionary Decision-Making 
In Garner, the Court deferred to the parole board in part because the 
decision to extend the review interval had been made by the board itself, and 
therefore, like the decisions of prison officials in conditions cases, could be 
characterized as “discretionary.” 113 What is striking about Garner is that it reads 
not like an ex post facto case at all, but rather like a prison conditions case of the 
 
 109. See Wayne A. Logan, The Ex Post Facto Clause and the Jurisprudence of Punishment, 35 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1261, 1267 (1998). 
 110. THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James 
Madison). 
 111. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 138 (1809). 
 112. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28–29 (1981). See also Evan C. Zoldan, Reviving 
Legislative Generality, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 625, 654 (2014), explaining that “[w]hen a legislature enacts 
retroactive legislation, it acts with the knowledge of conduct that has already occurred.” As a result, 
“retroactive legislation permits the legislature to punish . . . an individual without naming him 
specifically but with knowledge of whom the legislation will . . . harm.” Id. 
 113. Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 259 (2000). 
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same period. In the years before the turn of the millennium, the Court had 
decided several prison cases that were designed in no small part to get courts out 
of the business of supervising prisons, and to reduce the federal courts’ 
burgeoning docket of prisoners’ rights litigation.114 These cases emphasized the 
broad discretion that prison authorities needed (in order to run their institutions 
safely), and at bottom said that interference by federal courts was appropriate 
only in exceptional circumstances. As a result, prisoners could, for example, be 
transferred from one prison to another,115 or they could be moved from general 
population into a disciplinary setting,116 and prison libraries could be maintained 
and modified,117 without undue judicial interference. Garner was decided at a 
time when prison authorities got huge deference from the Court in prison 
conditions cases. We think this blurred the lines, and obscured the key 
jurisprudential differences, between cases brought under the Due Process Clause 
(alleging deprivation of a constitutional liberty or property interest) or the Eighth 
Amendment (alleging cruel and unusual punishment), and cases brought under 
the Ex Post Facto Clause (alleging a prohibited retroactive increase in 
punishment). 
Despite the Garner Court’s importation of the term “discretionary,” the 
Court did little to explain what the parole board’s exercise of discretion regarding 
parole vis-à-vis the Ex Post Facto Clause has to do with prison officials’ exercise 
of discretion regarding prison management or conditions vis-à-vis the Due 
 
 114. See, e.g., Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (holding that discipline in segregated 
confinement did not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might 
conceivably create a liberty interest). The Sandin Court said  
that the involvement of federal courts in the day-to-day management of prisons . . . often 
squander[s] judicial resources with little offsetting benefit to anyone. In so doing, it has run 
counter to the view expressed in several of our cases that federal courts ought to afford appro-
priate deference and flexibility to state officials trying to manage a volatile environment. 
Id. at 482–83 (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 470–71 (1983); Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor 
Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977); Wolff v. McDonald, 418 U.S. 539, 561–63 (1974)). The Court 
said, “Such flexibility is especially warranted in the fine-tuning of the ordinary incidents of prison life.” 
Id. at 483. Congress had expressed similar sentiments in passing the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1997a–1997j (2012) (making it much harder for prisoners to file, or to win, civil rights cases 
in federal courts). 
 115. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976) (holding that the Due Process Clause does not 
impose a nationwide rule mandating transfer hearings). 
 116. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486–87. 
 117. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 363 (1996). 
620 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  106:593 
Process Clause or the Eighth Amendment.118 We think the answer is very little, 
and that the Court misapplied any such assumed or subconscious analogy.119 
The Ex Post Facto Clause protects against changes in law or policy 
(typically aimed at classes of prisoners and applied retrospectively to all such 
individuals) that increase punishment, and it should apply regardless of whether 
prison officials or parole boards are making “discretionary” policy decisions or 
are carrying out the mandatory will of the legislature or the executive.120 The 
 
 118. If legislators or executive officials were to take steps—even “discretionary” steps—to 
increase prisoners’ punishment after the fact (for example, by making prisoners serve more time, or to 
require hard labor where none had been required before), we think the Ex Post Facto Clause would apply 
to such changes. Conditions cases, where the discretion involves things like moving prisoners from one 
facility to another or changing out the volumes in the prison law library, bear only the most attenuated 
connection to punishment, as Morales (correctly) makes clear. See Cal. Dep’t of Corr. v. Morales, 514 
U.S. 499, 508–11 (1995). But just because we defer to prison officials on some issues (that get marginal 
protection under a different part of the Constitution) does not mean that we should defer to prison 
officials or parole boards if the effect of their actions is to increase sentences or to impose other forms 
of punishment retroactively in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. 
 119. In his concurrence in Garner, Justice Scalia made it seem like almost any discretionary 
decision of the board would be beyond judicial review—though it isn’t entirely clear if that was because 
in his view discretionary decisions could not ever come under the Ex Post Facto Clause because they 
are not laws, or because they are discretionary. Compare Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 257 (2000) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“I would agree with the Court’s opinion if we were faced with an amendment 
to the frequency of parole-eligibility determinations prescribed by the Georgia legislature.”) with id. at 
258–59 (“[W]here, as here, the length of the reconsideration period is entrusted to the discretion of the 
same body that has discretion over the ultimate parole determination, any risk engendered by changes 
to the length of that period is merely part of the uncertainty which was inherent in the discretionary 
parole system . . . .”) (emphasis in original). 
 120. Foster v. Booker, 595 F.3d 353 (6th Cir. 2010), presented an interesting issue in this regard. 
Over time, statutory changes in sentencing laws had resulted in much longer felony sentences. The result 
was a mushrooming prison population without a concomitant increase in the size of the parole board or 
its resources. In response, the parole board made a “discretionary” decision to focus on short-term 
prisoners who could be released quickly and easily, freeing up badly needed bed space. Consequently, 
long-term prisoners, and especially parolable lifers, did not get reviewed on the schedule required by 
statute. See Bey v. Rubitschun, No. 05-71318, 2007 WL 7705668, at *21–23 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 23, 2007). 
Although prisoners had sued (and had won declaratory and injunctive relief) under the Due Process 
Clause to enforce the statutorily mandated parole review schedule, see, for example, Swearington v. 
Johnson, 709 F.2d 1509 (6th Cir. 1983), we think the Ex Post Facto Clause is the better claim. The 
parole board’s policy favored one group of prisoners over another, with the result that people convicted 
of more serious crimes wound up serving more time than they would have served had their review not 
been delayed. As the then chair of the board noted, 
It is fair to say that the board was overwhelmed by the numbers at some point, and that we 
had to put our energy and resources into interviewing prisoners who were most likely to be 
paroled. Lifer interviews got pushed back, and even when we did lifer interviews, it was more 
to comply with the law, and not with an eye to moving anyone forward to parole, because we 
were so far behind in our work. In the best of circumstances we kept just marginally abreast 
of the regular parole cases, and no doubt . . . the lifers suffered for it. 
Foster, 595 F.3d at 367 (quoting William Hudson, chair of the parole board from 1985–1991); see also 
Plaintiffs’ Brief in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 38, Bey v. Rubitschun, No. 05-
71318, 2007 WL 7705668 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 1, 2006) (ECF No. 114). And of course, in Bey itself the 
district court found that the parole board did not just gradually get more conservative over time, but 
rather the Governor signed legislation that eliminated the existing parole board and created a new board 
for the purpose of making violent prisoners serve longer sentences. Bey, 2007 WL 7705668, at *10–12, 
2018] WRONG TURN ON THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE 621 
ability of the parole board to use its discretion to change its administrative rules 
is distinct from its ability, once it is applying those rules, to make the 
discretionary decision whether to grant or deny parole in a given case. It is in the 
latter kind of decision-making that discretion typically gets the most deference 
from reviewing courts; yet even there courts should step in if the board is vio-
lating the Ex Post Facto Clause in a specific case.121 If we are wrong, and if 
“discretion” in the broadest sense gets the board a free pass, then it is hard to see 
why the Ex Post Facto Clause would prevent a board, for example, from deciding 
“in its discretion” not to release prisoners until they have served, say, 80 percent 
of their sentences, or for that matter to eliminate parole altogether, even if those 
changes overturn decades of consistent policy to the contrary.122 Indeed, we 
reiterate that Garner itself acknowledges that “[t]he presence of discretion does 
not displace the protections of the Ex Post Facto Clause.”123 
Peugh also undercuts the Garner Court’s and other courts’ reliance on 
“discretion.” In Peugh, the government argued that the Ex Post Facto Clause did 
not apply because judges retained discretion in sentencing and were not bound 
by the sentencing guidelines.124 The Court rejected that argument, holding that 
because the guidelines served as the “lodestone” in sentencing, changing the 
 
rev’d, Foster v. Booker, 595 F.3d 353 (6th Cir. 2010). We think that is the very definition of an ex post 
facto violation. 
 121. See supra note 83 (discussing Mickens-Thomas I and Mickens-Thomas II). 
 122. The elimination of parole is the paradigmatic example. The entire criminal justice system is 
built upon the parole regime in place when the defendant commits the crime. The prosecutor relies on it 
in choosing what to charge and what to offer by way of plea bargain; the defense counsel relies on it in 
counseling the defendant whether to plead guilty or go to trial; the defendant relies on it in making that 
choice; the probation department relies on it in recommending a sentence; and the judge relies on it 
imposing the sentence. If, after the fact, the board can simply (in its discretion) stop granting paroles, so 
that all prisoners must serve the maximum term instead of having a fair chance at parole upon serving 
the minimum, then the Ex Post Facto Clause is a worthless shell. We think the historical legal standard 
is spot-on: if the change of law that triggers or governs the board’s altered exercise of its discretion 
creates a sufficient risk that some prisoners will serve more time than they would have served in the past 
absent the change, then the Ex Post Facto Clause should prohibit the change, period. 
 123. Garner, 529 U.S. at 253. We concede that in parole decision-making some organic change 
should be expected over time, as old parole board members leave and new ones are appointed. We see 
similar cyclical swings with appellate courts, as the mood of the country or the mores of the majority 
shift. But with parole boards, as with courts, typically the “shape” of these cycles will be a relatively flat 
sine curve with a fairly long amplitude. As noted above, in Foster-Bey the parole board had civil service 
protection and lifetime tenure for decades before statutory amendments eliminated the parole board and 
replaced it with new gubernatorial appointees. See Bey, 2007 WL 7705668, at *4 (discussed at note 79); 
cf. Julio A. Thompson, Note, A Board Does Not a Bench Make: Denying Quasi-Judicial Immunity to 
Parole Board Members in Section 1983 Damages Actions, 87 MICH. L. REV. 241, 252 (1988) (noting 
that, as of 1988, parole board members were typically selected by governors, subject to legislative 
approval, and usually appointed for three to six years). When parole rates decline sharply from long-
term historical norms on the heels of a new administration taking power and amending parole laws or 
regulations, that is exactly the kind of retroactive increase in punishment that we think the Ex Post Facto 
Clause was intended to prevent. See, e.g., Burnette v. Fahey, 687 F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2012); see also 
supra Part III.A; note 83 (discussing Mickens-Thomas I and Mickens-Thomas II). 
 124. Peugh v. U.S., 569 U.S. 530, 544–48 (2013). 
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guidelines—even if they were discretionary—nevertheless presented a sufficient 
risk that some prisoners would get or would serve longer sentences.125 
Accordingly, we think that “discretion” is a bright-red herring in ex post 
facto analysis. As to both “per se” cases and as to “possible” cases, whether the 
change is “discretionary” should have little or nothing to do with the Court’s 
analysis under the Ex Post Facto Clause. We therefore think that the increasingly 
ubiquitous Garner-based notion in the lower courts—that prisoner-plaintiffs 
must also prove that the change could not have occurred as a result of the board’s 
“exercise of its discretion”—is dead wrong, and ought to be excised from ex post 
facto analysis. 
C. A Sustained Look at “Possible” Ex Post Facto Cases 
We now turn to the second category of ex post facto cases—the “possible” 
cases—where it is the implementation of the change of law or policy that will 
determine whether or not there is a sufficient risk of prisoners serving longer 
sentences. We agree that this second category makes good sense analytically 
where changes in parole law or policy may not explicitly or obviously increase 
punishment. Prisoners are prone to challenge even de minimus changes, and this 
second category provides a useful mechanism to review what Morales called the 
more “attenuated” cases, which may require a fact-based decision. The category 
of “possible” ex post facto cases also illustrates that what at first blush might 
look like a benign change can violate the Ex Post Facto Clause if the change 
creates a sufficient risk that some prisoners will serve longer sentences. 
In Garner, the Court held that “[t]he requisite risk is not inherent in the 
framework of [the amended rule], and it has not otherwise been demonstrated on 
the record.”126 The Court thus treated the case as a “possible” ex post facto case 
and remanded it back to the trial court for factual development.127 The Court said 
that the relevant inquiry would look at how the board is implementing the 
change, whether the change is being used to deny parole and lengthen terms of 
custody, what policies animated the change, and how the board is actually 
 
 125. Id. at 544. We also note that legislatures exercise their “discretion” when they choose to 
amend a statute, and governors exercise their “discretion” when they sign the amended legislation into 
law. No one is forcing them to do these things. Yet despite the fact that they are exercising their 
discretion, if the text or the effect of the change is to increase punishment after the fact, the changes 
cannot be applied retroactively, consistent with the Ex Post Facto Clause. 
 126. Garner, 529 U.S. at 251. 
 127. See supra Part IV.A (discussing why we think placing Garner into the group of “possible” 
ex post facto claims was a mistake). On remand in Garner, the district court was to determine whether 
the amended Georgia rule, in its operation, created a significant risk of increased punishment. See Jones 
v. Garner, 211 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2000) (mem.). But the plaintiff died before that inquiry could be 
completed. The district court found that the ex post facto claim did not survive the plaintiff’s death and 
dismissed his claims as moot. Order, Jones v. Garner, No. 95-CV-3012 (N.D. Ga. June 19, 2001) (ECF 
No. 81). 
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exercising its discretion on the ground.128 These strike us as appropriate things 
to do with an underdeveloped “possible” ex post facto claim.129 
But more factual development should only be required for true “possible” 
cases, where the changes to the parole regime are arguably de minimus or 
attenuated, yet not so de minimus or attenuated that the trial court can dismiss 
the cases outright on the pleadings under Rule 12(b)(6).130 But Garner also 
muddled the treatment of ex post facto cases (and especially “possible” ex post 
facto cases) in two important ways, which we tackle next. 
1. Burdens of Proof and Persuasion 
First, the Garner Court sent a confusing message by the awkward way it 
addressed the question of the prisoner’s burden of persuasion. Up to and 
including Morales, the Supreme Court’s legal standard in ex post facto cases had 
been “whether a given change in law presents a ‘sufficient risk of increasing the 
measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes.’”131 In Garner, however, 
the Court substituted the word “significant” for “sufficient”—almost as if the 
two were synonymous.132 Justice Kennedy did not do so consistently, and he still 
recited the legal standard as set forth above (using the “sufficient” language). 133 
But reading the opinion, one cannot help but come away with the feeling that the 
prisoner-plaintiff lost (what we view as) his “per se” claim in no small part 
because he failed to prove a “significant” risk that he (or others) might serve 
more time. 134 No one on the Court seemed to have noticed the switch, but the 
lower courts certainly did!135 
The shift is subtle but extremely “significant.” It is also wrong. The only 
time the Court had used the words “significant” or “substantial” regarding an ex 
post facto claim was back in the pre-Collins day, when defendants or prisoners 
could win an ex post facto claim (even if they did not fit within the four Calder 
categories) by showing, variously, “a legal signification more injurious to the 
accused than was attached to them by the law existing at the time of the 
 
 128. Garner, 529 U.S. at 255 (suggesting that “the general operation of the Georgia parole system 
may produce relevant evidence and inform further analysis on the point”). 
 129. As noted above, on the facts of Garner, we think this procedure is unnecessary or misguided, 
and a major deviation from the Court’s jurisprudence before and after Garner (in Lindsey, Weaver, 
Morales, and Peugh). See supra Part IV. 
 130. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 
 131. Peugh, 569 U.S. at 539 (citing Garner quoting Morales). In Peugh, the Court reaffirmed 
that the line between an ex post facto violation and a permissible change “is a matter of degree.” Id. 
(quoting Morales). 
 132. See generally Garner, 529 U.S. at 244. 
 133. Garner, 529 U.S. at 250. 
 134. Id. at 251, 254. 
 135. The post-Garner losing cases consistently use the word “significant.” See, e.g., Burnette v. 
Fahey, 687 F.3d 171, 184–85 (4th Cir. 2012); Foster v. Booker, 595 F.3d 353, 361 (6th Cir. 2010); Dyer 
v. Bowlen, 465 F.3d 280, 289–90 (6th Cir. 2006); Richardson v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 423 F.3d 
282, 293–94 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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transaction,”136 or a change that deprived them of a “substantial right involved 
in [their] liberty,”137 or that the retroactive change “substantially alter[ed] the 
consequences attached to a crime already completed.”138 In this context, the 
words “significant” and “substantial” were used to give criminal defendants or 
prisoners extra protections that the Calder categories did not otherwise cover. 
But after Collins, any use of those terms would be improper, because either 
the claim fits within one of the four Calder categories, or it does not. The Court 
has said unequivocally that the Ex Post Facto Clause applies equally to 
sentencing and to parole because both determine how long the person will serve 
(and both affect the sentence imposed).139 Since sentencing and parole lie at the 
heart of the third Calder category (increased punishment), requiring a higher 
burden of persuasion than in Weaver, Morales, Lynce, and Peugh cannot be right, 
as all four of those cases are likewise Calder third-category cases. In Garner, the 
switch from “sufficient” risk to “significant” or “substantial” risk occurred 
without citation to any authority, and none exists. We think the only question (as 
to the plaintiff’s burden of persuasion) is whether or not a “sufficient risk of 
increased punishment” has been shown, and of course the plaintiff’s burden of 
proof (at least in a Section 1983 action) is the same as in any other civil case: 51 
percent (a preponderance of the evidence). 
Nor is there any policy reason to raise the burden of persuasion from 
“sufficient risk” to “significant risk”—or, for that matter, to require prisoners to 
prove the negative fact that any increased punishment could not be attributable 
to the board’s exercise of its discretion. To the contrary, the default in ex post 
facto cases should run the other way because of the nature of the harm. The harm 
at stake in ex post facto cases is the worst legal harm that people can suffer short 
of state-imposed death—namely, the forced loss of liberty.140 No increased 
punishment can be imposed, absent notice when the crime was committed (as to 
what the punishment would be). The very foundation of the Ex Post Facto Clause 
is to prevent the state from illegally extending a person’s loss of liberty after the 
fact. So a doctrine that effectively requires the harm to occur, or the risk of the 
harm to be “significant,” before courts will say that the Ex Post Facto Clause has 
 
 136. Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 249 (1883). 
 137. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 352 (1898). 
 138. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 33 (1981). 
 139. See supra notes 35 and 57. 
 140. Nor is any after-the-fact damage remedy likely to be available. A Section 1983 action for 
unlawful confinement would require the prisoner-plaintiff to show that the illegality of the law in 
question was “clearly established” in order to overcome the defense of qualified immunity. See, e.g., 
Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 
But, by definition, the law would not be “clearly established” unless or until the prisoner had won the 
ex post facto case, and so the state would rarely if ever pay damages for the illegal extra imprisonment 
it imposed. See, e.g., Taylor v. Reilly, 685 F.3d 1110, 1114–17 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding that parole 
officials applying current parole regulations to prisoners would not have reason to know that doing so 
would create significant risk of prolonged incarceration, which is required for prisoners’ rights under the 
Ex Post Facto Clause to be clearly established). 
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been violated would be anathema to the Framers141 and is a cold comfort to 
prisoners. Yet that is exactly the situation today, as Garner has been read by the 
lower courts.142 Prisoners have little hope of ever meeting the current legal 
standard until the harm to them has already occurred. 
Moreover, the kind of proof required (to demonstrate that the risk of 
delayed release is “significant” and that changes in how the board exercises its 
discretion could not account for the delayed consideration or release) is a kind 
of proof that prisoners are uniquely ill-equipped and ill-positioned ever to 
acquire. Most prisoners’ rights cases are filed in pro per,143 and there is no reason 
to think cases raising ex post facto claims are an exception to the rule.144 It is one 
 
 141. See, for example, THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), explaining that: 
The creation of crimes after the commission of the fact, or, in other words, the subjecting of 
men to punishment for things which, when they were done, were breaches of no law, and the 
practice of arbitrary imprisonments, have been, in all ages, the favorite and most formidable 
instruments of tyranny. 
Id. 
 142. If hindsight is 20/20, then we can say with confidence that current ex post facto doctrine 
reaches the wrong result nearly every time. For example, when (in 1993) parolable lifers in Michigan 
first challenged the increase in the interval between their parole reviews, the prisoners lost because the 
Sixth Circuit held that not enough time had elapsed for them to prove that the delays alone would 
inevitably result in longer prison terms. Shabazz v. Gabry, 123 F.3d 909, 914–15 (6th Cir. 1997). When 
(in 2005) they brought a global challenge to all the retroactive changes of the previous decade, the 
prisoners lost because the Sixth Circuit held that they couldn’t prove that the changes were not caused 
by the board’s exercise of its discretion. See Foster v. Booker, 595 F.3d 353, 361 (6th Cir. 2010). 
  What we know in hindsight is that parolable lifers in Michigan wound up serving vastly 
longer sentences than they would have served under the regime that existed when they were sentenced, 
and vastly longer sentences than they likely would have served but for the legislative, executive, and 
board policy changes that were applied retroactively to them in the late-twentieth and early-twenty-first 
centuries. See, e.g., CITIZENS ALL. ON PRISONS & PUB. SPENDING, WHEN “LIFE” DID NOT MEAN LIFE: 
A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF LIFE SENTENCES IMPOSED IN MICHIGAN SINCE 1900 (2006), 
http://www.capps-mi.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/When-life-did-not-mean-life-2006.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/QE6G-9VE7]. Indeed, the changes were so clear and so harsh that (in 2014) twenty-
seven employees and former employees of the Michigan Department of Corrections signed a statement 
decrying the plight of the state’s parolable lifers and urging reforms. See Mich. Dep’t of Corr. Prof’ls 
Comment on Lifer Paroles (2014), http://www.capps-mi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/rev-
Michigan-Department-of-Corrections-Professionals-Comment-on-Lifer-Paroles.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/78NK-DM4G]. The signatories included three long-serving former MDOC directors, a 
deputy director, two parole board chairs (including the one who had chaired the post-1992 conservative 
“life means life” board), as well as a raft of wardens, deputy wardens, and former parole board members. 
Id. 
 143. See Margo Schlanger, Trends in Prisoner Litigation, as the PLRA Enters Adulthood, 5 U.C. 
IRVINE L. REV. 153, 166–67 (2015). 
 144. In a study that our clinic did in the late 1980s, we looked at twelve months of pro se 
prisoners’ filings in the Eastern District of Michigan. The study (using random sampling) showed that 
of the 585 cases filed, 40 percent of the cases were dismissed by magistrate judges under 28 U.S.C. § 
1915(d) before service of process. Another 57 percent were dismissed on motions to dismiss or on 
summary judgment, and in most of those cases the prisoners never filed another document after the form 
complaint. At any point in the process, less than 7 percent of the prisoners ever had a lawyer, and in 
those cases the lawyer withdrew before the end of the case about 60 percent of the time. See Plaintiff’s 
Reply Brief, Appendix, Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536 (1989). These findings were consistent with 
more detailed studies at the time. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of 
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thing to say, as Justice Thomas said in Morales,145 that prisoners have the 
“burden of persuasion” in “per se” cases like Lynce, Weaver, and Morales, where 
in reality the Court read the statute and held as a matter of law that the challenged 
amendments did (or as in Morales did not) “produce[] a sufficient risk of 
increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes.”146 It is a 
completely different thing to require prisoners to prove a “significant risk”147 
and to prove the negative fact that any harm they suffer could not be the result 
of a change in the way the board exercises its discretion.148 
To meet these burdens under current ex post facto doctrine would require 
not just lawyers to represent the plaintiffs, but also elaborate and expensive 
discovery. It almost certainly would also require the services of high-end 
statistical experts to exclude all other variables that might arguably be the cause 
of longer prison terms. None of this is within the reach of unrepresented 
prisoners. Nor can prisoners amass the sort of practical on-the-ground evidence 
that would be the focus of the factual inquiry, and that invariably requires 
depositions, document requests, and other in-depth discovery. If a prisoner must 
produce “specific evidence” of the risk, as a practical matter his action is usually 
doomed, especially if he is proceeding pro se.149 We note that even with lawyers 
who have the time and resources to do elaborate and expensive discovery, the 
burden has still proven to be too high.150 
2. How Individualized Must an Ex Post Facto Showing Be? 
Second, Garner is unclear about whether the prisoner must show that some 
prisoners will serve longer sentences or must show that the prisoner-plaintiff 
himself will serve a longer sentence. Again, as with “sufficient” versus 
“significant,” Garner appears to say both.151 This, too, has confused the lower 
courts, leading them to require a higher burden of persuasion or burden of 
proof—for example, by making prisoners show a risk of increased confinement 
with respect to the specific plaintiff raising the claim as opposed to similarly 
situated potential parolees.152 This kind of showing is familiar to courts where 
 
Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 692 (1987) (noting that “[o]ver the three years 
studied, only seventeen prisoner constitutional tort cases were counseled”). 
 145. See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text. 
 146. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 509, 510 n.6 (1995). 
 147. Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 250–51 (2000). 
 148. Foster v. Booker, 595 F.3d 353 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 149. One of the ironies of the current doctrine is that ex post facto sentencing claims—where the 
legal standard is easier to meet—are more likely to be brought by appointed trial or appellate counsel, 
while ex post facto parole cases arise long after the prisoner has a right to counsel. 
 150. See, e.g., Foster, 595 F.3d at 361 (holding that plaintiff must show that his harm is not 
attributable to board’s exercise of discretion); Richardson v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 423 F.3d 282, 
284 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that the parole board may be using improper standard, but plaintiff failed to 
show that he was individually harmed by it). 
 151. See Garner, 529 U.S. at 250–54 (suggesting either or both). 
 152. See, e.g., Burnette v. Fahey, 687 F.3d 171, 184 (4th Cir. 2012); Richardson, 423 F.3d at 291. 
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the plaintiff must prove individualized harm in order to win both on liability and 
damages (or to win injunctive relief) and may have been mistakenly invoked as 
a kind of default, but it should not be used in ex post facto cases. On this issue, 
even the Morales Court consistently referred to “classes” of prisoners, “some 
prisoners,” “any prisoner’s actual term of confinement,” and the like.153 The 
Court pointedly did not require a showing that Mr. Morales’ own punishment 
would increase.154 Garner is unique in suggesting such a requirement when 
Weaver, Morales, Lynce, and Peugh do not. 
D. “Possible” Cases: Putting It Together 
Where further factual development is required (which will be the norm for 
“possible” ex post facto claims), there is yet one more reason why the burden of 
persuasion on prisoner-plaintiffs should be light. In nearly all of these cases, it is 
the state defendants (prison staff, corrections administrators, parole board 
members) or their agents who possess the information that the court needs in 
order to make an informed decision. The state defendants will be the keepers of 
the statistics from which parole rates can be calculated, and they will have the 
memos and emails that reveal the state’s motivation in implementing the changes 
(to the extent that motivation or credibility might be relevant). The defendants 
will also have the parole files and notes bearing on how the changes have affected 
the board’s actual decision-making on the ground, among other relevant data or 
information. 
In other situations of information asymmetry, courts have often imposed a 
series of shifting burdens. In workplace discrimination cases, for example, the 
plaintiff must make out a prima facie case showing that discrimination could 
account for the alleged harm.155 The burden then shifts to the employer to rebut 
this prima facie case by articulating some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
for the employment action.156 If the defendants succeed, the plaintiff still gets a 
chance to avoid dismissal if the plaintiff can show that the innocent explanation 
is a pretext.157 A similar evidentiary progression is used in Batson158 
challenges—where a criminal defendant alleges discriminatory jury strikes by 
the prosecution—for the same reasons.159 A claim brought by a prisoner under 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)160 shares this structure as 
 
 153. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 512–13, 520 (1995). 
 154. Id. at 512–14. 
 155. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973) (laying out this 
framework for Title VII workplace discrimination claims). 
 156. Id. Texas Dep’t of Cmty Affairs v. Burdine clarified that in the context of Title VII claims, 
the employer bears a “burden of production” at this stage and that the plaintiff retains the “ultimate 
burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination.” 450 U.S. 248, 
255–56 (1981). 
 157. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. 
 158. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 159. Id. at 93–94. 
 160. 42 U.S.C. § 2000b(b) (2012). 
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well.161 While these areas of law may have distinctive characteristics, the 
consistent parallel—and the one that matters in the context of ex post facto 
prisoner litigation—is the significant information asymmetry between the 
plaintiff and the defendants. Although these burden-shifting schemes are not 
without trenchant critiques162—which we do not take lightly—we nonetheless 
think that, in an area that at present lacks coherent doctrine, looking to familiar 
and (relatively) easy-to-implement structures may help courts make decisions 
that are more consonant with the purpose of the Ex Post Facto Clause and more 
consistent from case to case. Burden shifting is one such possibility, though 
courts should be open to others as well. 
If burden shifting were adopted for “possible” ex post facto claims, evi-
dence that might carry the plaintiff’s initial burden could include: a prima facie 
showing that the prisoner’s “eligibility for reduced imprisonment [was] a signi-
ficant factor entering into both the defendant’s decision to plea bargain and the 
judge’s calculation of the sentence to be imposed,”163 evidence that the purpose 
of the change was to “get tough” on prisoners or otherwise to extend sentences, 
or evidence from past or present DOC or parole board officials that similarly-
situated prisoners seem to be serving longer sentences than in the past. We also 
think that in “possible” ex post facto cases the trial court should appoint counsel 
and permit discovery as early as practicable but certainly if the prisoner-plaintiff 
meets his initial burden of persuasion as to the plausible effect of the change. 
The burden would then shift to the government to show that, in its 
operation, the challenged change does not pose a “sufficient risk” of increasing 
punishment, which the plaintiff could then challenge as pretextual or wrong. This 
might still pose a high bar for prisoner-plaintiffs, but it would be a sea change 
over their current burden of having to prove both that there is a “significant” risk 
of increased incarceration and that the harm they have suffered cannot be attri-
butable to the exercise of the board’s discretion. In our view, the initial burden 
on the plaintiff should be quite light, given the extraordinary nature of the harm, 
 
 161. Another area of law in which a similar burden-shifting structure exists is the antitrust Rule 
of Reason, where the plaintiff must initially show that the restraint produces anticompetitive effects in 
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the historical legal standard applied in these cases, and the prophylactic purpose 
of the Ex Post Facto Clause. 
E. A New (Old) Approach to Ex Post Facto Doctrine 
To summarize, the Ex Post Facto Clause is all but gutted if (1) prisoners 
cannot prove their ex post facto claims until after they have already suffered the 
very harm (increased punishment) that the Clause was designed to protect 
against, and (2) the prisoners’ burden of proof is raised to the point that pro se 
litigants (or even represented plaintiffs) can never meet it. Yet under current ex 
post facto doctrine, almost no changes to parole regimes can be challenged 
successfully, no matter how harmful their effect.164 The irony, of course, is that 
until very recently, nearly all the statutory and policy changes regarding parole 
over the past fifty years have been in the direction of harsher treatment for 
prisoners, as a result of political shifts from the 1960s to the 2000s, combined 
with the fact that the Court has not accepted a parole ex post facto case since 
Garner in 2000.165 
In this section we have tried to make sense of the Court’s cases and impose 
some order by clarifying two types of ex post facto claims—those in which there 
is a “per se” violation that can be decided as a matter of law and those in which 
there is a “possible” violation that requires fact-finding. In both of these types of 
cases, where the criminal defendant or prisoner-plaintiff is challenging a 
normative, structural type of change that affects all similarly situated prisoners, 
we think the Supreme Court’s long-established legal standard remains good law 
and should always apply. As the Court confirmed in Peugh, “The touchstone of 
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[the] Court’s inquiry is whether a given change in law presents a ‘sufficient risk 
of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes.’” 166 
If Garner is read narrowly, as Peugh read it, and as we think it should be 
read, then most parole ex post facto cases should fit comfortably into the first 
category of obvious “per se” claims. Historically, the Court has had little trouble 
determining as a matter of law whether a change in a sentencing or parole regime 
creates a sufficient risk of increasing some prisoners’ punishment. Morales is a 
good example even though it went against the prisoner: the harm to twice-
convicted murderers of slightly delayed parole review was negligible. Peugh is 
also a good example: there the disagreement among the Justices was about 
whether the changes to the parole guidelines fell within the ambit of the Ex Post 
Facto Clause, but no one doubted that some prisoners would serve longer 
sentences as a result of those changes. We think Garner itself was also a good 
example (just gone wrong): the delayed parole review met the standard of 
Weaver, Morales, and Lynce (as later applied by the Court in Peugh) and 
therefore should have been treated as a “per se” ex post facto violation. 
CONCLUSION 
Today the Ex Post Facto Clause no longer protects a powerless 
disenfranchised minority (prisoners) from “arbitrary and potentially vindictive 
legislation” and the passing political forces that give rise to it, as the Supreme 
Court said the Ex Post Facto Clause must.167 To the contrary, the Court’s modest 
“about face” in Morales and its abstruse opinion in Garner have resulted in far 
longer sentences for some prisoners, whom the legislative or executive branches 
specifically targeted for harsher treatment long after the prisoners committed 
their crimes. The harsher treatment has resulted in precisely the harm that the Ex 
Post Facto Clause was designed to prevent. The extra time people serve on the 
back end of their sentences—as the result of delayed or denied parole—can add 
years to their incarceration, and cumulatively can add hundreds of millions of 
dollars to the costs of corrections nationally, now with close to zero 
constitutional protection under the Ex Post Facto Clause. At the same time, in its 
sentencing ex post facto cases (most recently represented by Peugh), the Court 
has continued to apply its traditional scrupulous ex post facto standard, holding 
that changes which might result in longer sentences for some defendants cannot 
be applied retroactively. While the Court’s analytical split may be inadvertent 
and may have been heightened by the lower courts, it is no less illogical. The Ex 
Post Facto Clause remains robust when applied to sentencing, but the clause has 
become toothless as applied to parole, despite historically identical doctrine and 
identical harm. The wrong turn needs to be corrected. 
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